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Freedom of the Press 2.0 
 
Abstract 
 
In today’s digital age, copyright law is changing.  It now 
attempts to regulate machines.  Over the past twenty years, and 
particularly with the advent of the Internet, copyright holders have 
increasingly invoked copyright law to regulate directly—indeed, even 
to prohibit—the manufacture and sale of technology that facilitates 
the mass dissemination of expressive works. Although the concerns 
of copyright holders about the ease of digital copying are 
understandable, the expansion of copyright law to regulate—and, in 
some cases, to prohibit—technologies raises a troubling question.  
Can the government regulate under copyright law technologies that 
facilitate the dissemination of speech, consistent with the First 
Amendment?  If so, are there any limits to what the government can 
do?  Or does copyright law have constitutional carte blanche to 
regulate technologies, without any First Amendment scrutiny?  
Because copyright law, dating back to the first Copyright Act of 
1790, traditionally refrained from regulating technologies directly, 
these questions were scarcely considered before.   But, today, these 
questions have vital importance as copyright law and other laws 
proposed in service of copyright holders contemplate even greater 
regulation of emerging technologies that are revolutionizing the 
ability of individuals to create expressive content on the Internet, in 
the “Web 2.0” culture of user-created content.  However, despite their 
importance, these questions have escaped attention in legal 
scholarship.  This Article attempts to answer these questions by 
tracing the historical development of the “freedom of the press” that 
led to the Framers’ inclusion of the concept in the First Amendment.  
My core thesis is twofold: (i) the Framers understood the freedom of 
the press as the freedom of the printing press—a speech technology—
to be free of intrusive governmental regulation, including restrictions 
on technology imposed under copyright law; and (ii) today, the Sony 
safe harbor operates as a “First Amendment safeguard” within 
copyright law that is designed to protect the freedom of the press and 
the development of speech technologies.  All future attempts by 
Congress to regulate speech technologies under copyright law must 
answer to the Free Press Clause or the Sony safe harbor. 
Freedom of the Press 2.0 
Edward S. Lee* 
 
Ever since the days of the printing press, copyright law has affected 
the regulation of technology that mass produces books and other works for 
dissemination to the public.  But, historically, copyright did so only 
indirectly.  Instead of regulating the technology of the printing press itself, 
the first copyright act in England, known as the Statute of Anne,1 only 
regulated the products of printing, i.e., who owned the exclusive rights to 
print and publish works of authorship.  The printing press itself was left off-
limits from monopoly and government control, marking a profound change 
from the prior regime of the British Crown under which the printing presses 
were regulated in virtually all respects, including a strict limit on the total 
number of presses allowed in England.  That limitation on the number of 
printing presses, along with the requirement of licensing and registration 
before any work could be published, effectively served the dual ends of 
censorship and monopoly.  Limiting the number of presses was intended to 
limit the number of publications deemed to be heretical or piratical.  Control 
over the technology, in other words, effectuated control over content.  The 
Statute of Anne replaced this repressive regime of press regulation with a 
system of author’s rights.  And it did so while staying clear of regulating 
any aspect of the printing press, or the machines of mass publication.  
Copyright law was thus borne with a freedom of the press—an aversion to 
government control over the technology that enables the mass publication of 
speech.  This basic corollary of copyright—a freedom of the press—lasted 
for well over two hundred years.   
   
 Today, however, copyright has begun to change.  It now attempts to 
regulate machines.  Over the past twenty years, and particularly with the 
advent of the Internet, copyright holders have increasingly invoked 
copyright law to regulate directly—indeed, even to prohibit—the 
manufacture and sale of technology that facilitates the mass dissemination 
of expressive works.  In 1984, Universal City Studios and Disney asserted, 
unsuccessfully, a claim of secondary liability under copyright law to stop 
Sony’s manufacture of video recorders.2  The Supreme Court rejected what 
it characterized as an “unprecedented” attempt by copyright holders to stop 
a technology from production.3  The Court held that Sony could not be held 
secondarily liable for the copyright infringement of users of its devices:  
liability does not attach to the mere distribution of a technology that is 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University.  
I thank David Goldberger, David McGowan, Mark Rose, Chris Sprigman, and Peter Shane 
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.     
1  8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
2  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
3  Id. 
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“capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”4  In 2005, the Court revisited 
the Sony doctrine in a case involving two distributors of p2p software used 
by some individuals for illegal music file-sharing.  In Grokster, the Court 
clarified that the Sony decision established a “safe harbor” for the design 
and distribution of technologies that are capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses.5  But the Sony safe harbor does not shield defendants who attempt to 
“actively induce” others to use their products for copyright infringement.6  
As explained in Grokster, although the Sony safe harbor offers some 
immunity to technology developers, it is not blanket immunity.      
 
 Parallel to these developments in copyright law has been the 
enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA),7 
which even more directly regulates, by prohibiting, the manufacture and 
sale of technologies that can be used to circumvent encryption of 
copyrighted works.  Although these “circumventing” technologies may be 
different in kind from technologies (such as the printing press or copier) that 
themselves mass produce copies, the anti-circumvention law shares a 
similar aim with the aforementioned claims of secondary liability to regulate 
technologies directly, instead of the mere acts of copying.  This major shift 
in copyright law to encompass the direct regulation of technology can no 
doubt be attributed to the advances in digital technology, especially related 
to the Internet and forms of digital copying.  Digital technology makes it 
easier for everyone to make near perfect copies, instantaneously, often in 
ways that constitute copyright infringement.  In the future, we can only 
expect more claims by copyright holders to regulate technology that enables 
the mass production, copying, and dissemination of works.  The music and 
movie industries have already attempted to regulate digital video recorders 
(DVRs) such as TiVo through copyright litigation,8 and all digital receivers 
for radio and television under the controversial “broadcast flag” proposal in 
Congress.9 
 
                                                 
4  Id. at 442.  
5  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-80 
(2005). 
6  Id. at 2779-80. 
7  17 U.S.C. § 1201. 
8  See MPAA v. Replay TV, Civ. No. 01-09801 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 14, 2001); 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. RecordTV, No. 00-06443 (C.D. Cal. filed June 15, 2000); 
Twentieth Century Fox Film, Inc. v. Scour, Inc., No. 00 Civ. (S.D.N.Y. filed July 20, 2000); 
Maribel Rose Hilo, Tivo and the Incentive/Dissemination Conflict: The Economics of 
Extending Betamax to Personal Video Recorders, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1043 (2003). 
9  See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Communications’ Copyright Policy, 4 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.  L. 97 (2005). The FCC promulgated a broadcast flag rule, but the 
D.C. Circuit held that the rule fell outside the FCC’s authority.  American Library Ass’n v. 
FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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 Although the concerns of copyright holders about the ease of digital 
copying are understandable, the expansion of copyright law to regulate—
and, in some cases, to prohibit—technologies raises a troubling question.  
Can the government regulate under copyright law technologies that facilitate 
the dissemination of speech, consistent with the First Amendment?  If so, 
are there any limits to what the government can do?  Or does copyright law 
have constitutional carte blanche to regulate technologies, without any First 
Amendment scrutiny?   
 
Because copyright law traditionally refrained from regulating 
technologies directly, these questions were scarcely considered before.10   
But, today, these questions have vital importance as copyright law and other 
laws proposed in service of copyright holders contemplate even greater 
regulation of emerging technologies that are revolutionizing the ability of 
individuals to create expressive content on the Internet, in the “Web 2.0” 
culture of user-created content.  However, despite their importance, these 
questions have escaped attention in legal scholarship.  This Article attempts 
to answer these questions by tracing the historical development of the 
“freedom of the press” that led to the Framers’ inclusion of the concept in 
the First Amendment.  My core thesis is twofold: (i) the Framers understood 
the freedom of the press as the freedom of the printing press—a speech 
technology—to be free of intrusive governmental regulation, including 
restrictions on technology imposed under copyright law; and (ii) today, the 
Sony safe harbor operates as a “First Amendment safeguard” within 
copyright law that is designed to protect the freedom of the press and the 
development of speech technologies.      
 
Part I discusses the history of the freedom of the press, and its 
connection to the origin of copyright law.  The historical materials before 
                                                 
10  The literature on the First Amendment and government regulation of speech-
facilitating technologies outside of copyright law, such as under telecommunications law, has 
been extensive.  See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation 
of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57; Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of 
Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359 (2005); Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An 
Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J.  899 (1998); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise 
of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).  The 
literature analyzing the same issue within copyright law is sparse.  While some attention has 
been given to First Amendment concerns about the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) or potential liability of Internet service providers, see, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as 
the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414-29 (1999); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability 
for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 
GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000), no sustained attention has been devoted to the First Amendment or 
Free Press implications of copyright law’s attempted regulation of speech-facilitating 
technologies under secondary liability.  Ernest Miller provides a helpful start to the 
discussion in a recent essay.  Ernest Miller, First Amendment Scrutiny of Expanded 
Secondary Liability in Copyright, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 507 (2005). 
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and during the ratification of the Bill of Rights indicate that the Framers 
understood “the press” in “the freedom of the press” to refer primarily to the 
machine of the printing press, and not to any notion of an institutional 
“press” (of journalists) as we more commonly understand it today.  While 
the concept also stood more broadly for the freedom of individuals to print 
and publish materials, such as pamphlets and local newspapers, one of the 
most important animating principles of the freedom of the press was a 
technological one.  The freedom of press encapsulated the basic ability of 
individuals to use the printing press—the only technological means of mass 
publication then in existence—free from excessive governmental intrusion, 
such as prohibitions on the technology itself imposed by the British Crown.  
Indeed, the historical materials related to the framing of the Free Press 
Clause indicate that the Clause was understood as a limitation on the 
Copyright Clause and Congress’s power to grant copyrights.     
 
Part II draws the doctrinal connection between the freedom of the 
press and the Sony safe harbor in copyright law.  Although the Supreme 
Court has yet to fully tease out this doctrinal connection—and no copyright 
scholarship before has even suggested it, I demonstrate how, under the 
Court’s own precedents, the Sony safe harbor operates as a First 
Amendment safeguard within copyright law, just like the fair use and idea-
expression doctrines.  Although the Court has yet to formally recognize the 
Sony safe harbor as such, the Sony decision itself supports this conclusion.  
Even more, First Amendment principles and the Free Press Clause compel 
it.  The Sony safe harbor operates as a First Amendment safeguard under 
copyright law to protect speech-facilitating technologies from excessive 
governmental intrusion, consistent with the freedom of the press.  
 
Part III explores the significance of understanding the Sony safe 
harbor as a First Amendment safeguard. The distinction is more than a 
doctrinal nicety.  It has important ramifications for copyright law, 
particularly in today’s digital age.  First, to the extent that Congress enacts 
any copyright law that attempts to restrict speech technologies outside of the 
Sony/Grokster framework, First Amendment scrutiny is required.  Based on 
the free press concerns about such restrictions dating back to the Framers, 
controls on technology, even under copyright law, raise serious 
constitutional concerns.  Second, courts must apply the Sony safe harbor as 
a First Amendment safeguard within copyright law to protect free press 
interests.  Four free press principles are recommended.  
 
This Article fills a serious gap in the literature by tracing the 
historical connection between the freedom of the press and the origin of 
copyright law, and between the Copyright and the Free Press Clauses.  Most 
scholars tracing the Copyright Clause or the history of copyright have 
simply ignored the important role the freedom of the press played in the 
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genesis of copyright law as we understand it today.11  It is perhaps even 
more of a mystery that the Supreme Court has overlooked this important 
history, too.  By tracing the history of the freedom of the press in England 
and in early America and by examining the drafting history and debate of 
the Free Press Clause, this Article seeks to put copyright in its full historical 
perspective.  From the beginning of copyright, there was a deep skepticism 
of allowing government to control or prohibit a technology that facilitated 
the mass publication of speech.  The freedom of the press encapsulated that 
skepticism, and the Free Press Clause codified it into law.  All future 
attempts by Congress to regulate technologies through copyright law must 
answer to this history.      
         
I. The Freedom of the Press and Copyright Law’s Origin  
 
After nearly 300 years of existence, dating back to the Statute of 
Anne in England, one would think that the history of copyright law would 
be well understood by now.  It is not.  Courts, historians, and commentators 
have hardly considered, much less understood, the important relationship 
between the historical development of the freedom of the press and the 
origin of copyright law.  That relationship was fundamental to copyright 
law’s original design.  Copyright law first began in England as a less 
restrictive alternative to the Crown’s restrictions on the printing press, 
including severe limits on the total number of presses that were allowed.  
The origin of copyright law was one in which the notion of the freedom of 
the press operated as an important limit on government control over 
technology—attempts by government to dictate or limit the extent to which 
the public could use technologies of mass publication were viewed as 
suspect.  The Framers in the United States and the ratifying states embraced 
                                                 
11  Legal scholarship examining the connection between copyright and the freedom of 
the press, or the connection between the Copyright and Free Press Clauses, has been scant.  
Even Melville Nimmer, who wrote a seminal article about the connection between copyright 
and the First Amendment and an article specifically on the Free Press Clause, did not draw 
the connection.  See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment 
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204 (1970) 
[hereinafter Copyright]; Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a 
Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975). 
The most extensive discussion is provided in a short essay by L. Ray Patterson and 
Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright 
Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 
EMORY L.J. 909 (2003).  In other scholarship, only passing reference is made.  See BENJAMIN 
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 6 (1967) (referring to freedom of the press in 
recounting the demise of the Stationers’ Company); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20-27 (1968) (describing press control in England); L. Ray 
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1987) 
[hereinafter Free Speech]; Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Lockean Copyright, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 891, 898-905 (2006) (describing connection between Locke’s 
understanding of freedom of the press and his view of copyright as a right for authors). 
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this tradition even more strongly, recognizing this important limit in the 
Free Press Clause.  Below I sketch out this history.   
 
 A. The Freedom of the Press and Copyright in England 
 
The origin of copyright law cannot be understood without 
understanding the larger, historical context in which it arose.  Indeed, no 
history of copyright law can be considered accurate without an account of 
the freedom of the press.  One of the central points of my historical account 
is that the birth of copyright in England coincided with and reinforced the 
emerging concept of the freedom of the press.12  The Statute of Anne, the 
first copyright act in England, enacted in 1710, was a part of the eventual 
dismantling of the old regime of press regulation under the Crown, in which 
it regulated virtually all aspects of the printing press.  This dismantling of 
the old system was brought about by a growing recognition of the concept 
of the freedom of the press.  Copyright law reflected this new freedom by 
offering no authority for the government, publishers, or authors to limit the 
technology of the printing press.  Thus, instead of allowing government to 
control or limit the printing press to fight “piracy” of published works, as 
had been effectuated under the prior regime, copyright law originated as a 
direct, less restrictive alternative to government control of the presses.  
  
  1. The old system of press regulation 
 
The protection for an individual’s use of the printing press—free of 
intrusive governmental regulation—was a response to the repressive regime 
of strict regulation of the press that enabled the Crown and later Parliament 
to control the production of all printed materials in England from the 1500s 
until the early 1700s.13     
 
Indeed, the Crown controlled the printing presses in virtually all 
aspects.  The Crown instituted (1) a system of monopolies over printing 
under which the Crown limited the number of printing presses and master 
printers and gave authority to print materials only to a select few, notably, 
the Stationers’ Company, and (2) a system of licensing under which all 
                                                 
12  The Crown’s power to control the press was, from its inception, unlimited.  
FREDERICK SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776, at 28 (1952).  During 
the 16th and 17th centuries, the Crown controlled the entire printing industry by allowing 
printing only through (i) special grants of printing patents or royal prerogatives to individuals 
who were favorites of the Crown and (ii) the Stationers’ Company, a chartered guild of 
printers/publishers.  MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 12 (1993).   
13  I discuss the English history of copyright, given its clear influence on the Framers 
and the early American development of copyright law.  Copyright can be traced back even 
earlier to patent privileges in Venice and Rome.  See CHRISTOPHER L.C.E. WITCOMBE, 
COPYRIGHT IN THE RENAISSANCE 21-52 (2004).   
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materials had to be approved for publication.14  The two systems were, in 
fact, both parts of the same system of regulation of printing in England that 
was established under the Tudor reign.   
 
Spurred by the religious schism from the Catholic Church, Henry 
VIII imposed the first pre-publication licensing requirement under the 
Proclamation of 1538.15  In 1557, Philip and Mary (a devout Catholic) 
granted the royal charter of incorporation to the Stationers’ Company, a 
guild of printers/publishers, who became the only authorized group allowed 
to print books (other than those individuals who were granted printing 
patents from the Crown).16  Although Henry and Mary were on opposite 
sides of the religious schism, both saw the importance of controlling the 
presses as a way to control the content of publications, particularly, religious 
views.   
 
Building on these restrictions, Elizabeth I issued the Star Chamber 
Decree of 1586, which was “the most comprehensive regulation of the press 
of the entire Tudor period.”17  The Decree required that all printers register 
their presses with the Stationers’ Company, and that no presses could be set 
up outside of the London area (except for one press at Cambridge 
University, and the other at Oxford University).18  All presses were subject 
to warrantless search by the wardens of the Stationers’ Company; any 
violations of the Decree resulted in the destruction of the nonconforming 
printing press.19  The Decree went even further:  it banned the use of any 
printing press established within the past six months (of the Decree’s 
enactment), in order to reduce the number of printing presses to “so small a 
number” that the Archbishop of Canterbury and Bishop of London deemed 
proper.20  The Decree also imposed a licensing system on the publication of 
works under which all works were required to be approved by ecclesiastical 
authorities before publication,21 a requirement mirrored in the Stationers’ 
Company’s own ordinance that required its member printers to obtain a pre-
publication license from its officers.22       
 
This strict regulation of the printing press ruled England for well 
over a century, extending through the Stuart reign under James I and 
                                                 
14  See SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 47-63. 
15  Id. at 49. 
16  Id. at 65.  Initially, the printers who owned the printing presses also served as the 
publishers of the works.  Over time, printers and the publishers (or “booksellers”) came to be 
separate entities.  See PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 45-46.    
17  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 61. 
18  Star Chamber Ordinance of 1586, at §§ 1-2; see SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 69.   
19  Star Chamber Ordinance of 1586, at § 2. 
20  Id. § 3. 
21  Id. § 4; see SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 69. 
22  Id. at 71. 
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Charles I into the governance under Parliament, albeit with a gradual 
decrease in effectiveness.23  What is important to recognize is that the 
regulation of the press instituted by the Crown included not only a regime of 
licensing and monopoly grants for printing—two facets that are more 
commonly discussed in legal scholarship,24 but also the direct regulation of 
the technology of the printing press itself.  Starting with Elizabeth, the 
Crown limited the total number of printing presses in England and who 
could operate them.25  Indeed, the express goal of the Decree was to reduce 
the total number of printing presses in England from the status quo.  If used 
without authorization from the Crown, the printing press effectively became 
contraband.  Throughout this period, “unauthorized” presses arose.26  Such 
presses were illegal and, if found, were subject to seizure and destruction by 
the Stationers.27  The Stationers had the power to conduct (effectively 
warrantless) searches of other people’s houses, to confiscate illegal presses 
and materials.28  Backed by royal charter and the Printing Acts, the 
Stationers exercised a sweeping power over the press, in order to protect 
their copyrights and combat “piracy.”  In Patterson’s apt phrase, the 
Stationers were the “policemen of the press.”29 
   
This strict regulation of the press instituted by the Crown was 
replicated—and even further tightened—under Parliament’s rule starting in 
the mid-1600s following the execution of Charles I.30  The Printing Acts of 
1649, 1653, and 1662 carried forward the repressive controls on printing 
from the Crown, including the tight limits on the number of printing 
presses.31  Indeed, the Act of 1662 stated that there was “no surer means” of 
reducing the licentiousness of the press “than by reducing and limiting the 
number of printing-presses, and by ordering and settling the said art or 
mystery of printing by act of parliament, in manner as herein after is 
expressed.”32  To that end, the Printing Act of 1662 imposed strict limits on 
the total number of master printers (20) in all of England and the printing 
presses each could own (just 2).33  The goal was to reduce, by “death or 
otherwise,” the number of master printers to twenty.34   
                                                 
23  Id. at 107-12. 
24  See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional 
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283, 284-85 (1979). 
25  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 61.  In 1560, there were 8 or 10 master printers; by 
1600, there were 30.  Id. at 56. 
26  Id at 99, 136, 175. 
27  Id. at 84-85, 98, 136, 139, 175, 182, 186, 190-91. 
28  See Raymond Astbury, The Renewal of the Licensing Act in 1693 and Its Lapse in 
1695, 32 THE LIBRARY 296, 296 (1978). 
29  PATTERSON, supra note 11, at 6. 
30  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 221. 
31  Id. at 221, 228, 238.  
32  Printing Act of 1662, 14 Car. 2., c. 33 preamble (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
33  Id. § 11. 
34  Id.  
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From the beginning, this regime of control over the presses—not 
only in what content could be printed by whom, but also in the total number 
of printing presses—served the dual purposes of censorship and monopoly.  
As copyright historian Mark Rose explains, “censorship and trade regulation 
became inextricable, and this was a marriage that was to endure until the 
passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710.”35  The Stationers’ Company 
effectively held a perpetual monopoly over all book printing in England.  
Backed by the Crown, the printers controlled the presses, and everything 
that was printed.  The authors themselves generally held no rights to print 
their works.36  The Stationers sought the maintenance of these strict limits 
on the number of presses as a way to increase their monopoly over the 
printing industry and to stop the “piracy” of works published by unlicensed 
printers.37  The Stationers were not so much concerned about censorship (as 
the Crown was) as they were about controlling the entire publishing 
industry.  Controlling the presses—the only technology of mass 
publication—enabled the Stationers to protect their monopoly for over a 
century.  
 
2. The transition to the freedom of the press and a 
reformed system of copyright  
 
During the repressive regime of press regulation in the 1600s, a 
counter-movement for a “freedom of the press” had begun.  In 1629, 
Michael Sparke, who ran an unauthorized press, charged that the Star 
Chamber decree “directly intrench[es] on the hereditary liberty of the 
subject’s persons and goods.”38  Without referring to “freedom of the press” 
explicitly, John Milton wrote “Areopagitica” in 1644,39 in which he 
criticized the Crown’s regulation of the press:  “If we think to regulate 
printing, thereby to rectify manners, we must regulate all recreations and 
pastimes, all that is delightful to man.”40  Although Milton, an official 
censor himself at one time, probably condoned some forms of regulation of 
speech that was “utterly maleficent,”41 he advocated for unlicensed printing 
that left truth to be sorted out in debate.42  Other authors, such as Samuel 
                                                 
35  ROSE, supra note 12, at 13; id. at 15 (“Since both copyright and censorship were 
understood in terms of regulation of the press, it was difficult even to think about them as 
separable practices.”). 
36  Id. at 22. 
37  Id. at 68. 
38  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 140. 
39  The work, in fact, was published without the required license. See WILLIAM E. 
HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE 4 (1947). 
40  JOHN MILTON, THE AREOPAGITICA (1644). 
41  HOCKING, supra note 39, at 5; SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 196. 
42  HOCKING, supra note 39, at 5. 
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Hartlib,43 William Walwyn,44 and Henry Robinson,45 wrote in favor of a 
freedom in “printing” or the “press.”  John Lilburne, a key leader in the 
Leveller party, advocated for the freedom of the press and “that the Press 
might be open for us as you.”46  In 1649, the Leveller party petitioned 
Parliament to recognize a freedom of the press: 
 
As for any prejudice to Government thereby, if Government be just 
in its Constitution, and equal in its distributions, it will be good, if 
not absolutely necessary for them, to hear all voices and judgments, 
which they can never do, but by giving freedom to the Press, 
and…47 
 
The same banner was taken up by John Locke, one of the most 
influential political thinkers of his time.  In “Liberty of the Press,” written in 
1694 and 1695,48 Locke argued for man’s “liberty to print whatever he 
would speak.”49  One of the key insights of Locke was to recognize a 
connection between the freedom of the press and the need for reforming the 
monopoly over publishing held by the Stationers’ Company.  Locke 
suggested moving to a system of copyright in which authors, not publishers, 
held the rights for a limited term.50  Similarly, Daniel Defoe, writing in 
1704 about “the Regulation of the Press,” described a “Liberty in 
Printing”51 and also called for the recognition of rights for authors in their 
works, particularly against “Press-piracy” (a precursor to what we would 
call copyright infringement).52  Importantly, both Locke and Defoe 
attempted to reconcile the recognition of copyrights for authors with the 
freedom of the press.53  At bottom, the two issues were intertwined. 
                                                
 
At the same time, there were several efforts in Parliament to 
reinstate a licensing system after the Printing Act was not renewed, such as 
the Bill for Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses in February 1695.54  
That bill contained no limit on the number of presses and the trade was to be 
“open to all Persons,” but the bill was amended in November of that same 
year to limit the presses to certain locations within England, as a measure to 
 
43  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 192. 
44  Id. at 193 (“that the Press may be free for any man that writes nothing highly 
scandalous or dangerous to the state”). 
45  Id. at 194 (“greater liberty of speech, writing, Printing”). 
46  Id. at 199-201. 
47  Id. at 201. 
48  JOHN LOCKE, LOCKE: POLITICAL ESSAYS 329-38 (Mark Goldie ed. 1997). 
49  Id. at 331. 
50  Id. at 337. 
51  DANIEL DEFOE, ESSAY ON THE REGULATION OF THE PRESS (1704). 
52  Id. 
53  Id.  See JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS 56 (1994). 
54  RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 7 (2004). 
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protect the Stationers from greater competition.55  The Stationers again 
invoked fears of “piracy” of their books, in an effort to have Parliament pass 
tighter regulation of the printing industry.56   None of these bills ever 
passed, however.57  The sentiment for a freedom of the press had begun to 
take hold.  In 1695, when the Printing Act was allowed to lapse, the change 
was monumental:   
 
There were no more restrictions on the number (or location) of 
printers, or on the numbers of journeymen or apprentices.  There 
were no restrictions of the import of books.  Above all, there was no 
longer any legal obligation to enter new books on the Stationers’ 
Register, and, … certainly no guarantee that the courts would 
uphold the claims of the copy-owning booksellers.58   
 
As before, when the Star Chamber was abolished, the Stationers 
lobbied heavily for re-securing their old rights.59  Eventually, the Stationers 
asked for property rights in the books they printed, instead of a 
reinstatement of the Printing Act, which appeared to have fallen out of 
disfavor.60  But what they got was different:  in 1710, Parliament enacted 
the Statute of Anne, the first copyright act in England.  The Act established, 
“for the Encouragement of Learning,” a system of copyrights for authors 
with a limited term of fourteen years of copyright (renewable once).   
 
Although the several ideas of freedom of the press, author’s rights, 
and copyrights of limited duration were not necessarily viewed as a 
systematic bloc, the ideas worked together to free the printing press from 
governmental and monopoly control.  If an individual had the “liberty to 
print whatever he would speak,” then neither the Stationers nor the Crown 
should be allowed to control the number of printing presses and printers, or 
what could be printed.  So, too, if authors held the rights to print their own 
works—neither the Stationers nor the Crown could have a monopoly on the 
entire printing industry.61  But, to avoid substituting one monopoly for 
another, Parliament decided that the copyrights authors received should be 
of limited duration.62  And the technology of the printing press was no 
longer subject to government controls. 
                                                 
55  Id. at 13-14. 
56  Id. at 18; SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 307. 
57  DEAZLEY, supra note 54 at 28; SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 306.   
58  FEATHER, supra note 53, at 50. 
59  ROSE, supra note 12, at 36. 
60  DEAZLEY, supra note 54, at 1-29. 
61  ROSE, supra note 12, at 47.  Patterson views the switch from publishers to authors 
being entitled to copyrights as a key development for the freedom of the press because 
authors had less potential to control the presses (e.g., “even the most prolific author would 
produce a fraction of press output”).  Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 11, at 18. 
62  ROSE, supra note 12, at 47. 
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Of the innovations in the system of reformed copyright established 
by the Statute of Anne, the most underappreciated among legal scholars is 
its approach to technology.  Perhaps this is understandable because 
commentators have more often focused on what the Statute of Anne said, 
instead of what it did not say.  Of course, what the Statute of Anne said was 
that (1) copyright had a limited term and (2) the rights accrued to authors.63  
While significant, these two more commonly recognized innovations of the 
Statute of Anne probably pale in comparison to the revolutionary change in 
approach effectuated by the Statute of Anne’s departure from the past press 
regulations.  Notably, the Statute of Anne did not attempt to limit the 
number of printing presses or printers, or otherwise regulate the presses as 
was the case under the Printing Acts.64   
 
The significance of this sea change cannot be overstated.  For over 
100 years, the Printings Acts (and the earlier Star Chamber Decree of 1586) 
ruled the presses in England until the final Act lapsed in 1695.  The 
Stationers tried desperately to have another Printing Act enacted; indeed, 13 
bills were rejected between 1695 and 1709.65  But, instead of a Printing Act, 
the Statute of Anne was enacted.  When viewed in this historical context, 
the most important innovation of the Statute of Anne was probably 
contained in what it did not say:  the Statute of Anne made no attempt to 
control the printing presses as the Printing Acts did before.66  No longer 
could the Crown or Parliament control the technology of the presses, at the 
service of publishers to protect them from piracy.  Nor could, for that 
matter, the newly recognized class of authors assert any statutory power 
over the technology.  This sea change ushered in a reformed system of 
copyright, shaped and ultimately limited by the freedom of the press.   
 
                                                 
63  Id. at 4.   
64  The reasons for Parliament’s inability to enact continued printing controls were 
probably several, including division among Parliament and the ineffectiveness of the old 
regime.  SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 260, 300-01, 306.  Part of the demise of the Printing Acts 
was precipitated by antipathy for it and the growing calls for the freedom of the press.  By the 
1700s, it was no longer politically tenable for government to openly oppose the freedom of 
the press.  Id. at 305.   
65  DEAZLEY, supra note 54, at 28-29. 
66  Even with the lapse of the Printing Act, the freedom of the press was not 
necessarily guaranteed or complete.  Post-publication punishment for libel remained a huge 
controversy.  Even those who advocated for a freedom of the press were willing to allow 
some limitations, such as liability for certain printed material under the common law.  Id. at 
4.  Prosecutions for seditious libel continued into the 1800s in England.  See WILLIAM H. 
WICKWAR, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 1819-1832, at 102-14 (1928).  
The same question over seditious libel and its relationship to the freedom of the press would 
recur in the American Republic with the Sedition Act of 1798, which expired in 1801 and 
was never renewed.  See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 n.16 (1964). 
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The connection between copyright and the freedom of the press is 
also evidenced in the original understanding of the freedom of the press.  It 
is well recognized that copyright originally developed in reaction to the 
advent of the printing press, which multiplied exponentially the number of 
copies of works that could be made.  But what is often overlooked today is 
that freedom of the press also developed in response to the printing press.  
Indeed, the freedom of the press historically meant the freedom of printing, 
or, more specifically, the freedom of the printing press.   
 
In 17th and 18th century England, the “press” referred to the 
technology of the printing press or, more generally, the publishing of any 
material by the printing press.67  The “press” only later became to be 
associated more narrowly with newspapers and newsreporting.68   Samuel 
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, for example, defined “press” 
in 1778 as “[t]he instrument by which books are printed.”69  No definition 
included any reference to the modern understanding of the press as agents 
who report news.  The freedom of the press stood broadly for the “the 
personal liberty of the writer to express his thoughts in the more improved 
way invented by human ingenuity in the form of the press.”70  It marked a 
sentiment that government should not be allowed to control or interfere with 
the public’s ability to use the technology that enabled the mass production 
of speech. 
 
This understanding is evident in Blackstone’s Commentaries.  
Blackstone took a more limited view of the freedom of the press in England 
as consisting of “no previous restraints upon publication, [but] not in 
freedom from censure from criminal matter when published.”71  Even under 
this more limited view, Blackstone tied the freedom of the press in England 
to the end of the press regulation under the Printing Acts, “which limited the 
number of printers, and of presses which each should employ, and 
prohibited new publications unless previously approved by proper 
licensers.”72  In this key passage, Blackstone specifically recognized how 
                                                 
67  WICKWAR, supra note 66, at 13-14 (“Freedom of the press must be held to embrace 
the whole practice of printing, and to refer as much to the printing-press as to its products.”); 
id. at 75 (“My whole and sole object … has been a Free Press and Free Discussion…. I had 
never read a page of Paine’s writings; but I had a complete conviction that there was 
something wrong somewhere, and that the right application of the printing-press was the 
remedy.”) (statement of Richard Carlile, printer convicted for publishing “blasphemous” 
work, Paine’s Age of Reason). 
68  Id. at 13-14.  In 1695, only one newspaper existed—the official government 
newspaper, London Gazette.  See DEAZLEY, supra note 54, at 11. 
69  SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1778). 
70  FRANCIS LUDLOW HOLT, THE LAW OF LIBEL . . . IN THE LAW OF ENGLAND (first 
American edition 1818) (London, J. Butterworth and Son 1816), excerpted in HAROLD L. 
NELSON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 18-19 (1967). 
71  4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 151 (Robert Bell ed., 1771) (emphasis added). 
72  Id. at 152 n.a.   
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the Crown’s limits on the technology—and not just the prepublication 
licensing system—operated as restraints on the freedom of the press.  After 
the Printing Acts expired, “the press became properly free” and “has ever 
since so continued,” Blackstone concluded.73  
 
This brief history of the freedom of the press and copyright law in 
England illuminates several points that are important for understanding the 
tradition in which copyright law developed, first in England and later in the 
United States.  First, calls for the freedom of the press were made to stop the 
government’s and the Stationers’ control over the printing press.  Second, 
copyright law developed in conjunction with the notion of the freedom of 
the press, as a part of the effort to break up the monopoly control over the 
printing press and what could be printed by whom.  Third, and finally, the 
copyright system replaced a regime of press regulation, in which the 
government could control and limit the technology of the press itself, with a 
reformed system of author’s rights that left the printing presses themselves 
free of regulation.  Copyright was born with the freedom of the press, not 
against it.74   
 
B. The Freedom of the Press and Copyright in Early 
America 
 
In this section, I show that the Framers understood a connection 
between copyright law and the freedom of the press, and, specifically, a 
connection between the Copyright Clause and the Free Press Clause.  The 
connection was one of limitation: the Free Press Clause limited the 
Copyright Clause.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73  Id. 
74  Two years after the Statute of Anne was passed, Parliament enacted the Stamp Act 
of 1711, which imposed a duty on all paper used for printed materials.  See DEAZLEY, supra 
note 54, 43-44.  Although the Stamp Act may have been enacted in part to restrict the amount 
of material published by the press, the penalty for failure to pay the duty on paper was the 
loss of copyright (“all Property therein”) in the underlying work—a result that was arguably 
consistent with the freedom of the press in that it immediately allowed everyone to “freely 
print and publish” the work.  Id. at 44 (quoting Stamp Act, 1712, 10 Anne, ch. 18 (Eng.)).  
The Stamp Act remained controversial in England, however, with critics attacking it as a 
form of censorship.  See Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in 
the Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (1985).   It was finally repealed in 1861.  Id.  
In 1765, Parliament enacted a similar Stamp Act for the American colonies, in order to help 
fund the war effort in the Seven Years War, but the Act was repealed within a year due to the 
vocal protests of the colonists against “taxation without representation.”  Id. at 263-64.     
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1. The connection between the Copyright Clause 
and the Free Press Clause 
  
Most conventional accounts of the Framers’ understanding of 
copyright focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the Copyright Clause, 
which was part of the Constitution ratified in 1788.75  This account, 
however, only tells half the story.  As the ratifying debates show, the 
adoption of the Free Press Clause in the Bill of Rights was equally as 
important to the origin and design of copyright in the United States.  At the 
center of both copyright and the freedom of the press in the early Republic 
was the technology of the printing press.  It would be no exaggeration to 
describe the Free Press Clause as “the companion-piece of the Copyright 
Clause,” as Professors Patterson and Joyce suggest.76       
 
 a. Documentary evidence related to the Framing 
 
First, let us begin with the Copyright Clause, which states:  
Congress shall have the power “to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Inventions.”77  Similar in 
design to the Statue of Anne, the Copyright Clause authorizes the grant of 
copyright to authors, but only for limited times, in order to promote progress 
or learning.  Although the historical record related to Framers’ adoption of 
the Copyright Clause is rather scant (we have records of Madison’s and 
Pinckney’s several proposals, but no records of any Convention debate),78 it 
is fairly well accepted that the Framers drafted the Clause in reaction to the 
abuses of monopoly grants under the Crown in England.79  As the Supreme 
Court has recognized, the Copyright Clause “was written against the 
backdrop of the practices—eventually curtailed by the Statute of 
Monopolies—of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in 
goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public.”80  
Accordingly, the Clause acts as both “a grant of power and a limitation.”81  
Madison’s journal indicates that the Framers agreed upon the Copyright 
                                                 
75  See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
1-2 (1967). 
76  Patterson & Joyce, supra note 11, at 946. 
77  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
78  See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of 
the Progress of Science as Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 
GEORGETOWN L.J. 1771, 1775 (2006). 
79  See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 675, 676, 688-95 (2002). 
80  Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).   
81  Id. at 5. 
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Clause—which had been introduced during the last weeks of the 
Convention82—“nem: con,” with no one speaking against.83     
 
But the history of the Copyright Clause did not end with the 
Constitution’s ratification in 1788.  The other important element came in 
1789 through 1791, when the Free Press Clause in the Bill of Rights was 
proposed, debated, and then ratified.  (The Free Speech Clause was also 
relevant to copyright, but much less discussed compared to the Free Press 
Clause.)  In the popular debates concerning the ratification of the 
Constitution, one of the main objections of the Antifederalists was the 
absence of any specific recognition for the freedom of the press. George 
Mason of Pennsylvania, one of the Framers at the Convention, wrote, 
“[t]here is no declaration of any kind for preserving the liberty of the 
press.”84  Richard Henry Lee, a Virginian and Antifederalist who wrote as 
the Federal Farmer, stated: “The people’s or the printers’ claim to a free 
press, is founded on the fundamental laws, that is, compacts, and state 
constitutions, made by the people.  The people, who can annihilate or alter 
those constitutions, can annihilate or limit this right.”85   The Anti-
Federalists feared that, without a Bill of Rights, Congress could “restrain the 
printers, and put them under regulation.”86  Among the Antifederalists’ 
concerns about the lack of a Bill of Rights, the need for a Free Press Clause 
was paramount.87 
 
The Federalists recognized the strength of the Antifederalists’ 
objection, even after the Federalists had succeeded in avoiding the inclusion 
of a Bill of Rights in the drafting of the Constitution.  During the 
Constitution’s ratification process among the states, the Federalists 
attempted to allay the Antifederalists’ concerns.  James Wilson, a Framer at 
the Convention and a leading Federalist, gave an impassioned speech at the 
State House Yard in Philadelphia to address the Antifederalists’ objections; 
Wilson’s speech was widely published in 34 newspapers, across 27 cities.88  
As to the freedom of the press, Wilson contended: 
 
                                                 
82  1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 435-36 
(1971). 
83  BUGBEE, supra note 75, at 1. 
84  George Mason, Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution, 1787, reprinted 
in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 443.  
85  Letter from the Federal Farmer XVI (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
86  David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 468-
69 (1983). 
87  Id. at 467-68. 
88  See William T. Mayton, From a Legacy of Suppression to the “Metaphor of the 
Fourth Estate,” 39 STAN. L. REV. 139, 144 n.27 (1986). 
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[T]he liberty of the press, which has been a copious subject of 
declamation and opposition: what controul can proceed from the 
federal government, to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium for 
national freedom?  If, indeed, a power similar to that which has 
been granted for the regulation of commerce, had been granted to 
regulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to 
stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, 
as that impost should be general in its operation.…In truth, … the 
proposed system possesses no influence whatever on the press; and 
it would have been merely nugatory, to have introduced a formal 
declaration upon the subject; nay, that very declaration might have 
been construed to apply that some degree of power was given, since 
we undertook to define its extent.89 
 
Wilson’s rejoinder to the Antifederalist objection voiced the mainline 
position of the Federalists: if no power was expressly given to Congress in 
the Constitution, Congress could not infringe any right within that area.  
 
 But what is most notable in Wilson’s address is his small 
concession (italicized above) that a Free Press Clause would be needed if 
Congress had a power “to regulate literary publications.”  Apparently, 
Wilson did not view the Copyright Clause, which gives Congress the power 
to grant exclusive rights over literary works, as a power that “regulate[s] 
literary publications.”  Wilson, however, offered no explanation on why the 
Copyright Clause did not constitute such a power as one might reasonably 
think.  After all, copyrights certainly do regulate the copying and 
dissemination of literary publications.  Wilson’s terse explanation left the 
Federalist position open to attack.      
 
And attack the Antifederalists did.  The Antifederalists specifically 
pointed to the  Copyright Clause as the power by which the new Congress 
could control the technology of the printing press, as had been effectuated in 
England under the Printing Acts.90  As Robert Whitehall of Pennsylvania 
explained:  
 
                                                 
89  James Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia, reprinted 
in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 529 (emphasis added).  
90  The Antifederalists also pointed to Congress’s powers to tax and to define offenses 
against the law of nations, as well as the Supremacy Clause, as potentially giving Congress 
the power to curb the freedom of the press.  See Timoleon, Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in THE 
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 104-05 (1997) (tax power and Supremacy Clause); Cincinnatus, 
Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 106; The Federal 
Farmer, Jan. 20, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 109 (tax 
power); A Plebeian, Spring 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 111 
(“indefinite powers granted to the general government”). 
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Tho[ugh] it is not declared that Congress have a power to destroy 
the liberty of the press; yet in effect, they will have it . . . . They 
have a power to secure to authors the right of their writings.  Under 
this, they may license the press, no doubt; and under licensing the 
press, they may suppress it.91 
 
Federalist James Iredell offered a more lengthy response than 
Wilson to the Antifederalists’ argument, specifically emphasizing the 
coexistence of a reformed copyright system and the freedom of the press in 
England following the enactment of the Statute of Anne.  In this passage, it 
becomes manifest how closely the issues of copyright and the freedom of 
the press were associated in the minds of the Framers:    
 
The liberty of the press is always a grand topic for declamation, but 
the future Congress will have no other authority over this than to 
secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege of 
publishing their works.  This authority has been long exercised in 
England, where the press is as free as among ourselves or in any 
country in the world; and surely such an encouragement to genius is 
no restraint upon others it is certainly a reasonable one, and can be 
attended with no danger of copies not being sufficiently multiplied, 
because the interest of the proprietor will always induce him to 
publish a quantity fully equal to the demand.  Besides, that such 
encouragement may give birth to many excellent writings which 
would otherwise have never appeared.  If the Congress should 
exercise any other power over the press than this, they will do it 
without any warrant from this constitution, and must answer for it 
as any other act of tyranny.92 
 
Hugh Williamson, a Framer at the Constitutional Convention and Federalist 
from North Carolina, expressed similar views: 
 
We have been told that the liberty of the press is not secured by the 
new Constitution.  Be pleased to examine the Plan, and you will 
find that the liberty of the press and the laws of Mahomet are 
equally affected by it.  The new government is to have the power of 
protecting literary property; the very power which you have by a 
special act delegated to the present congress.  There was a time in 
England, when neither book, pamphlet, nor paper could be 
                                                 
91  2 Robert Whitehall, The Proceedings and Debates of the Pennsylvania Convention 
(1787), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 525 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978) (emphasis added).   
92  James Iredell, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution, 1788, 
in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 454. 
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published without a license from government.  That restraint was 
finally removed in the year 1694 and, by such removal, their press 
became perfectly free, for it is not under the restraint of any license.  
Certainly the new government can have no power to impose 
restraints.93    
 
The debate between the Antifederalists and Federalists over the 
freedom of the press is quite significant in three respects.  First, both sides 
explicitly consider the possibility that copyright could infringe the freedom 
of the press—if enacted with a licensing system, for example, as Whitehall 
points out, no doubt referring to the old British system.  Iredell, a Federalist, 
even appears to concede that copyright can act as a “power over the press,” 
when he explains that Congress would be acting unconstitutionally if it 
exercised “any other power over the press”—meaning any power other than 
copyright.  Second, both the Antifederalists and Federalists refer to the 
practices in England as the source for their arguments—the Antifederalists 
pointing to the old system of press regulation under the British Crown for 
their criticism of Congress’s copyright power, while the Federalists pointing 
to the reform system of copyright after the Printing Acts had lapsed and the 
Statute of Anne was enacted, as the basis for their rejoinder.  These 
references further validate the importance of considering the English history 
of copyright in attempting to understand the Framers’ views of copyright 
and the freedom of the press. 
 
Third, and most importantly, both the Antifederalists and 
Federalists share a common ground in rejecting the old regime of press 
regulation under the British Crown.  In other words, no Framer on either 
side of the debate over copyright or the freedom of the press suggested that 
the restrictions under the Printing Acts could be adopted under the new 
Constitution.  For example, Iredell, a leading Federalist from North Carolina 
(who would later become one of the original justices on the Supreme 
Court94), did not dispute that a licensing system would infringe the freedom 
of the press, but he instead referred to the reformed copyright system under 
the Statute of Anne in England—“where the press is as free as among 
ourselves or in any country in the world”—as the model for understanding 
the scope of Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause.   
 
Iredell conceded a very important point, however:  “If the Congress 
should exercise any other power over the press than this, they will do it 
without any warrant from this constitution, and must answer for it as any 
other act of tyranny.”  Iredell thus admitted that, even without a Free Press 
                                                 
93  Hugh Williamson, Remarks on the New Plan of Government, 1788, reprinted in 1 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 551. 
94  See 2 id. at 932. 
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Clause, Congress would be without constitutional authority to “exercise any 
other power over the press” through copyright law other than the basic kind 
of system of author’s rights modeled after the Statute of Anne—i.e., “no 
other authority over this than to secure to authors for a limited time an 
exclusive privilege of publishing their works.”    
 
Although Iredell did not specifically concede that the kind of 
technology limits on the total number of presses imposed by the Crown in 
England would be unconstitutional, I believe such a conclusion necessarily 
follows from his statement.  Iredell viewed the Copyright Clause power as 
quite limited:  “Congress will have no other authority over this than to 
secure to authors for a limited time an exclusive privilege of publishing their 
works.” Congress cannot “exercise any other power over the press than 
this.”  For Congress to impose a limit on the printing press under copyright 
law, even if to protect authors’ copyrights, would be to “exercise [a greater] 
power over the press” and would, therefore, be unconstitutional. 
 
Since Iredell represented the Federalist position, his concession 
becomes even more significant after the Antifederalists succeeded in 
obtaining the adoption of the Bill of Rights, including a Free Press Clause, 
ratified in 1791.  The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law 
… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”95  This explicit 
recognition of the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights only further 
solidified the connection between the freedom of the press and Congress’s 
copyright power.  As Madison, the introducer of the amendment, described, 
“The article of amendment, instead of supposing in Congress a power that 
might be exercised over the press, provided its freedom was not abridged, 
was meant as a positive denial to Congress of any power whatsoever on the 
subject…”96  The connection between the Free Press and the Copyright 
Clause was direct:  one limited the other.  Given the debate at the time of the 
ratification of the Constitution and the drafting of the Bill of Rights, we can 
fairly conclude that the Framers understood the freedom of the press to 
limit, specifically, the ability of government to restrict the printing press 
under copyright law, whether in the form of technology limits or a 
prepublication licensing system. 
 
Admittedly, there is no single piece of documentary evidence of the 
Framers’ intent that expressly states the constitutional principle I have 
outlined above.  But that is usually the case with most, if not all, questions 
of constitutional law.  Moreover, the documentary evidence related to the 
debates over the Free Press Clause is much more extensive than the 
                                                 
95  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
96  James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 143 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
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Copyright Clause.  Indeed, we have more documentary evidence related to 
the Framers’ views of the relationship between copyright and the freedom of 
the press than we do about the originality and limited times requirements, 
both of which the Supreme Court has already defined in interpreting the 
Copyright Clause.97  Individuals on both sides of the debate over the Free 
Press Clause drew explicit connections between the scope of copyright and 
the freedom of the press.  And they both referred to the history of copyright 
and the freedom of the press in England—a history that, as I have explained 
above, shows the connection between copyright and the freedom of the 
press following the dismantling of the repressive system of press regulation 
that ruled England for over 150 years.  As quoted above, Whitehall and 
Williamson both expressly described the “licensing” system in England as 
odious and unconstitutional under the new Constitution.  I believe it is fair 
to infer from these passages that the Framers viewed the technology controls 
under the Printing Acts (i.e., the limits on the number and ownership of 
presses) with the same disfavor.  The technology limits on the printing press 
were a crucial part of the Printing Acts, along with the licensing 
requirement, as is evident in Blackstone’s description of the freedom of the 
press.98  It would be hard to imagine that the Framers so expressly 
disfavored the licensing system of the Printing Acts, yet tacitly approved the 
restrictive technology limits on the press imposed by those same Acts.  
 
b. Textual analysis of the Free Press Clause 
 
  i. Original meaning of “the press” 
 
Further support for my position can be found in a close analysis of 
the text of the Free Press Clause.  As originally understood, the Free Press 
Clause was meant to protect the printing press.  Thus, technology limits on 
the press, such as limits on their number, would be anathema to the very 
notion of the freedom of the press.     
 
At the time of the Framing, the term “the press” referred to the 
printing press.99  It was common back then to refer to the printing press 
simply as “the press.”100  As Thomas Sheridan’s dictionary defined it in 
                                                 
97  See Feist Publns., Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1999) 
(originality); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (“limited Times”). 
98  4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 71, at 152 n.a. 
99  David Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002).  For a 
description of the (primitive) technology of the printing press in early America, see JEFFREY 
L. PALSEY, THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 25-26 (2001). 
100  Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to 
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
1371, 1401-02 (2003) (“When the First Amendment was written, the ‘press’ was literally the 
same as the printing press, merely a tool that any citizen could use to speak.”); see WILLIAM 
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1780, the press meant “the instrument by which books are printed”101—no 
definition of “press” included journalists or news reporters as a collective 
group or institution.  The centrality of the printing press to the whole 
concept of the freedom of the press is evident in Jefferson’s description of 
Virginia’s proposal of a Free Press Clause to the Constitution:  “Besides 
other objections of less moment, she will insist on annexing a bill of rights 
to the new constitution, i.e. a bill wherein the government shall declare … 2. 
Printing presses free.”102     
 
While the “press” may have also been understood to refer to the 
small-time printers and agents involved in printing or, more generally, to the 
collective enterprise of printing or publishing, the early understanding of the 
press did not refer to our modern notion of journalists or news reporters as 
an institution or group.103  
 
The absence of journalists from the early definition of “press” is 
understandable.  It bears out the fact that the technology of the printing 
press preceded, by several hundred years, the development of journalism.  
Journalism as an occupation or profession had yet to fully develop by the 
late 1700s.104  In early America, printing presses were small-time 
operations, consisting of one or two people, which required much labor.105  
The printers did not typically investigate news on their own; instead, they 
usually reported the news by copying it from other sources.106  While 
political reporting and commentary comprised a good deal of the material 
printed in the early America, the commentary, typically in pamphlets, were 
more partisan propaganda than objective newsreporting.  As Bernard Bailyn 
describes, “they were always essentially polemical, and aimed at rapidly 
shifting targets: at suddenly developing problems, unanticipated arguments, 
and swiftly rising, controversial figures.”107  The pamphlets were written by 
                                                                                                                  
E. BERRY ET AL., LAST RIGHTS: REVISITING FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS 156-57 (John C. 
Nerone ed., 1995). 
101  THOMAS SHERIDAN, A GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1780). 
102  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to C.W.F. Dumas (Feb. 12, 1788), in THE COMPLETE 
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 116 (emphasis added). 
103  Noah Webster’s first American dictionary published in 1828 did include the 
additional definition of “press” to include “[t]he art or business of printing and publishing,” 
with the following example:  “A free press is a great blessing to a free people; a licentious 
press is a curse to society.”  NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Johnson Reprint ed. 1970). The definition was third in the order, following (i) a 
machine by which any body is squeezed and (ii) a machine for printing; a printing-press.  
104  Anderson, supra note 99, at 446. 
105  HAZEL DICKEN-GARCIA, JOURNALISTIC STANDARDS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
AMERICA 18-19 (1989). 
106  Id. 
107  BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4 
(1967). 
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amateur writers, who held other occupations as “lawyers, ministers, 
merchants, or planters.”108   
 
Early newspapers were also highly partisan, at times even tied to a 
political party.109  This politicization of newspapers reflected the earlier 
enlistment of newspapers for the political cause against Great Britain.110  
Historians have even gone so far to describe this early period of American 
newspapers as “the era of the party press.”111  The description is hardly 
exaggeration, given that the Federalists and Antifederalists both had their 
own newspapers.112  To the extent that news was just reported (without 
particular slant), the information tended to consist of recounts of foreign 
news from foreign papers.113  On the domestic front, “news” had a much 
more political slant.114   It was not until the Civil War when newspapers in 
the United States embraced more neutral, fact-based news reporting as the 
predominant industry standard (a transformation that coincided with the 
development of the telegraph).115  It took several decades more for 
“objectivity” to be recognized as the standard for news reporting.116  
 
Given the partisan state of newspapers and pamphlets at the time of 
the Founding, it seems evident that the Framers had a much broader notion 
of “the press” in mind than pure newsreporting.  The printing press did more 
than just report news stories; at the time of the Framing, it offered a conduit 
for people to express their opinions, especially (but not only) political ones. 
An important feature of the freedom of the press was its technological focus.  
The printing press was revolutionary because it enabled mass production 
and dissemination of speech by a technology that was theoretically open to 
all, not just to the monks who scribed books117 or the Stationers who ran the 
presses in England with the Crown’s backing.  
 
As Andrew Bradford, the founder of The American Weekly 
Mercury, wrote in 1734, the freedom of the press was “a Liberty, within the 
Bounds of Law, for any Man to communicate to the public, his 
Sentiments.”118  Under the well-known alias “Cato,” libertarian writers John 
                                                 
108  Id. at 13-14. 
109  PALSEY, supra note 99, at 21. 
110  Id. at 41; see also id. at 31, 36.  Earlier, the history of newspapers in England had 
followed a similar partisanship.  See DEAZLEY, supra note 54, at 11-12. 
111  DICKEN-GARCIA, supra note 105, at 32. 
112  Id. at 36. 
113  DONALD H. STEWART, THE OPPOSITION PRESS OF THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 21-22 
(1969). 
114  Id. at 28. 
115  Id. at 52-55, 60. 
116  Id. at 98. 
117  ROSE, supra note 12, at 9. 
118  LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 41 (1966). 
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Trenchard and Thomas Gordon wrote in 1733, “the free Use of the Press . . . 
is open to all.”119 Writing later against the Sedition Act of 1798, Madison 
explained that the U.S. Constitution created a government “altogether 
different” from the British regime, one that recognized “a different degree 
of freedom in the use of the press.”120  The inclusion of the word “use” in 
“the free use of the press” and “freedom in the use of the press” makes 
unmistakably clear that Madison, Trenchard, and Gordon were referring to 
the machine of the printing press.  Jefferson made it even clearer in one of 
his letters to Madison, in which Jefferson wrote:  “Among other enormities, 
[the Sedition Act] undertakes to make certain matters criminal tho’ one of 
the amendments to the Constitution has expressly taken printing presses, 
etc., out of their coercion.”121  
 
When the Free Press Clause was drafted for the Bill of Rights (first 
by Madison), the Framers had numerous examples of free press clauses or 
statements to draw from.  It is evident in these predecessor materials that the 
technology of the printing press was chief among the concerns for 
constitutional protection, as Professor Anderson has shown in his exhaustive 
account of the history of the Free Press Clause.122  Even before the 
American Revolution, the Continental Congress declared in an address to 
Quebec in 1774, “The importance of this [freedom of the press] consists, 
besides the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in 
its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, in its 
ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential 
promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed or 
intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.”123  
Here, the Continental Congress saw the importance of the printing press in 
disseminating viewpoints. 
 
The state constitutions during the Revolutionary War recognized 
similar concerns about protecting the press.  Nine of the eleven state 
constitutions adopted during this period expressly recognized the freedom of 
the press.124  Indeed, the state governments at this time may have perceived 
the freedom of the press as being even more important a right to protect than 
the freedom of speech, given that only one state, Pennsylvania, expressly 
recognized the freedom of speech as well.125  The original state constitution 
                                                 
119  Id. at 31.   
120  4 ELIOT’S DEBATES ON THE CONSTITUTION 569-70 (1907). 
121  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 7, 1798), in 7 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266-67 (P. Ford ed. 1896). 
122  Anderson, supra note 86, at 455-94. 
123  ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF QUEBEC (1774), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 82, at 223. 
124  Anderson, supra note 86, at 464-65. 
125  Id. at 465. 
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of Pennsylvania recognized:  “That the people have a right to freedom of 
speech, and writing, and publishing their sentiments; therefore the freedom 
of the press ought not to be restrained.”126   
 
The Framers at the Constitutional Convention did not adopt a Free 
Speech Clause (or a Bill of Rights).  But several Framers—George Mason 
of Virginia, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina—suggested it, late into the Convention; their proposals were 
rejected.127  (It is noteworthy that Pinckney had also been responsible for 
several proposals for the Copyright Clause.128)  The movement for a Free 
Press Clause resurfaced in the ratifying debates.  In ratifying the U.S. 
Constitution (then absent a Bill of Rights), Virginia proposed the inclusion 
of a free press clause with language similar to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution:  “That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of 
writing and publishing their sentiments; that the freedom of the press is one 
of the greatest bulwarks of liberty and ought not be violated.”129  Madison 
(who was eventually persuaded about the need for a Bill of Rights) adopted 
the Virginia language in his proposed Free Press Clause.130  Eventually, the 
language was shortened and modified to what is now contained in the First 
Amendment.131   
  
Legal scholars have long underappreciated the central importance 
technology played in the concept of the freedom of the press, as well as the 
importance the freedom of the press had for copyright law.  The freedom of 
the press was perhaps best encapsulated by English barrister Francis Ludlow 
Holt, who wrote in his book published in the U.S. in 1818, “[t]he liberty of 
the press, … properly understood, is the personal liberty of the writer to 
express his thoughts in the more improved way invented by human 
ingenuity in the form of the press.”132 As Professor Anderson has 
concluded, “Contemporaneous references uniformly indicate that freedom 
of the press meant freedom to express one’s views through use of the 
                                                 
126  1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 266 (emphasis added).  The Pennsylvania state 
constitution referred to the printing press in another clause: “The printing presses shall be 
free to every person who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any 
part of government.”  Id. at 273. 
127  Anderson, supra note 86, at 467. 
128  Ochoa & Rose, supra note 79, at 688-89. 
129  Anderson, supra note 86, at 473. 
130  Id. at 478. 
131  Id. at 475-86.  I recount the changes to the language of the Free Press Clause in the 
next section. 
132  NELSON, supra note 70, at 18-19; see also THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES 
OF THE AMERICAN UNION 605 (1868) (“We understand liberty of speech and of the press to 
imply not only liberty to publish, but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment 
for publication, so long as it is not harmful in its character, when tested by such standards as 
the law affords.”).   
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printing press.”133  What the printing press allowed was the mass 
publication of works of all kinds, increasing exponentially the number of 
people who could publish their own works and who could have access to 
countless other works published by others.  To speak anachronistically, the 
printing press was the Internet of its day.  It transformed the world from 
handwritten material scribed by monks to a world of printed material mass 
produced by machines.  People felt it necessary to protect this revolutionary 
technology from governmental control, given the century and a half of 
abuses of the Crown and Parliament in controlling virtually all aspects of 
the presses, including their total number, ownership, and use in England.  
Once press regulation was dismantled in favor of a freedom of the press, 
copyright law could claim no authority for restricting the press.   
 
 ii. Relationship between “speech” and “the press” 
y interpretation is further supported by the textual construction of 
the Fre
he more plausible construction of “the freedom of speech, or of 
the pres
 
M
e Speech and Press Clauses.  The clauses are written together to 
prohibit Congress from “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  
The construction makes it likely that the Framers meant “of speech” and “of 
the press” to be interpreted in parallel manner.134  In the first clause, “of 
speech” modifies or describes “freedom”—but not as a possessive.  In other 
words, freedom of speech does not mean “speech’s freedom,” as if speech 
itself possessed freedom.  It is the individual who possesses the freedom of 
speech.  If we interpret “the freedom of the press” in parallel fashion, then it 
becomes clear that “the press” does not refer to an institutional press (as in 
journalists).  For such a construction would mean that “of the press” is used 
as a possessive, rendering the freedom of the press to mean “the 
(institutional) press’s freedom”—as if the institutional press had a separate 
right recognized for itself, an interpretation propounded by the late-Justice 
Stewart (but without success to the entire Court).135  
 
T
s” is that all individuals possess the freedom of speech and of the 
press, the latter making it clear that government should not be allowed to 
control or restrict speech-facilitating technologies.136  This dual 
                                                 
133  Anderson, supra note 99, at 446 n.90. 
ights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 
E L.J
75) (“[T]he Free 
ent with the Supreme Court’s broad 
134  See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of R
YAL . 1193, 1267 (1992) (“[T]the two rights in the federal Bill are in pari materia; each 
must be construed in relation to the other, and it would be curious if freedom of the printed 
word were drastically more truncated than freedom of oral expression.”). 
135  Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (19
Press Clause extends protection to an institution.”). 
136  My interpretation of “press” is consist
understanding of the term.  The Court has never adopted the position that only members of 
the press can invoke the Free Press Clause.  See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the 
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understanding of (i) the freedom of speech and (ii) the freedom of the press 
as protecting separate, but related rights comports with the interpretive 
principle to avoid rendering constitutional text mere surplusage.137   
 
Granted, my reading effectively interprets “or” to mean something 
closer to “and” in this context.  But the drafting history and text of the First 
Amendment supports this interpretation.  Below I note the progression of 
the drafting language of the Free Press Clause.  The progression indicates 
that the Framers likely understood “or” in “the freedom of speech, or of the 
press” as a conjunction describing two separate, but related rights—the 
freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. 
 
The first quote below is Virginia’s proposal, which had language 
similar to the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Madison adopted substantially the 
Virginia language in his proposed Free Press Clause to the House, as noted 
in the quote 2.138  The House Committee of the Eleven made a stylistic 
change to Madison’s proposal, shortening the construction to “the freedom 
of speech, and of the press.”139  The House Committee of the Whole then 
approved the language and reported it to the House in August 1789, as noted 
below in quote 3; the House proposal combined the Speech/Press Clauses 
with Madison’s proposal for Assembly and Petition Clauses.   
 
In September 1789, the Senate considered the Bill of Rights 
proposals, including the Free Press Clause.  The Senate inserted “Congress” 
into the Free Speech and Press Clauses, and “or” was substituted in place of 
“and,” as noted in quote 4.  The Senate modeled its language on the House 
proposal for the Religion Clauses, which at first read:  “Congress shall make 
no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor 
shall the rights of conscience be infringed.”140  Eventually, the Senate 
combined the language of the Religion, Free Press/Speech, Petition, and 
Assembly Clauses into one amendment, as noted in quote 5.  After a report 
from Madison, the House proposed, as noted in quote 6, what turned out to 
be close to the final language adopted in the Bill of Rights. 
 
(1) Virginia proposal: “That the people have a right to 
freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; 
                                                                                                                  
press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they 
will as well as to utter it.”). 
137  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect.”); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 
52, 151 (1926) (same).  For further discussion of this interpretive principle, see Akhil Amar, 
Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
138  2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 82, at 1026. 
139  Id. at 1050. 
140  Id. at 1122. 
 27
that the freedom of the press is one of the greatest bulwarks of 
liberty and ought not be violated.”141   
 
(2) Madison proposal to House:  “The people shall not be 
deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish 
their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great 
bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”142 
 
(3) House language:  “The freedom of speech, and of the 
press, and the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and consult 
for their common good, and to apply to the government for redress 
of grievances, shall not be infringed.”143 
 
(4) Senate first change:  “That Congress shall make no law 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common good, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”144 
 
(5) Senate second change:  “Congress shall make no law 
establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting 
the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
the press, or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and 
petition to the government for the redress of grievances.”145 
 
(6) House final change (adopted in Bill of Rights):  
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble, and petition to the government for the redress 
of grievances.”146 
 
 This drafting history confirms that the Framers viewed the freedom 
of the press as a separate, but related right to the freedom of speech.  In 
order to understand the meaning of “or” in “the freedom of speech, or of the 
press,” we need look no further than the Religion Clauses that precede the 
Free Speech/Press Clauses. The word “or” was first introduced in the 
Religion Clauses, and, probably for stylistic reasons when the two sets of 
clauses were combined, the Senate changed the prior wording “the freedom 
of speech, and of the press” to “the freedom of speech, or the press” (quote 
                                                 
141  Id. at 842. 
142  Id. at 1026. 
143  Id. at 1122. 
144  Id. at 1149. 
145  Id. at 1153. 
146  Id. at 1160.  The Senate agreed to the change.  Id. at 1163. 
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4 above).  Yet the House was not satisfied with that wording and clarified 
the language to “the freedom of speech, or of the press,” further noting a 
separate dimension to the press (versus speech) (quote 6 above).  In the 
Religion Clauses, its two clauses are similarly differentiated by the word 
“or,” in the phrase “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”  Under the Court’s 
precedents, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause protect 
two separate, but related rights.147  By parallel construction, the Free Speech 
and the Free Press Clauses should as well. 
     
Based on the historical materials and text of the Free Press Clause, I 
believe the most plausible reason why the “freedom of the press” was 
recognized in addition to “freedom of speech” 148 was the perceived need to 
specify protection for the use of the machine itself.  Around that time 
period, some questioned whether anyone could ever have a natural or 
inherent right to use a machine, which had been developed by man “in a late 
progress of society.”149  But, as Holt wrote, “To this it may be answered, 
that the rights of nature, that is to say, of the free exercise of our faculties, 
must not be invidiously narrowed to any single form or shape.  They extend 
to every shape, and to every instrument, in which, and by whose assistance, 
those faculties can be exercised.”150   
 
Thus, in my view, the freedom of the press is designed to address—
or, at least, to clarify that the entire Free Speech and Press Clause 
covers151—a governmental restriction on speech technology.  Based on the 
drafting history and the inclusion of both “speech” and “the press” within 
the First Amendment freedoms, and the historical documents relating to the 
Framers’ debate over the Free Press Clause, we can reasonably conclude 
that the freedom of the press originally indicated constitutional protection 
specifically for the printing press and the ability of individuals to utilize this 
technology free of government control.  While the freedom of speech 
protects an individual’s basic right of expression, the freedom of the press is 
meant to ensure that speech technologies are free of governmental control.   
                                                 
147  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
148  Levy and Anderson both conclude that the freedom of the press originated before 
the freedom of speech.  LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 5-6 (1960); Anderson, 
supra note 86, at 487.  The state constitutions all recognized the freedom of the press, but 
only one (Pennsylvania) recognized the freedom of speech.  Id. 
149  LEVY, supra note 148, at 19. 
150  NELSON, supra note 70, at 18-19 (emphasis added); see id. at 19 (“The same 
character, therefore, of natural rights is conveyed to every right which is natural in its origin 
and principle through all the possible modes and instruments of exercising and launching it 
into action and employment.”) (emphasis added). 
151  To borrow Amar’s terminology, it is possible that the “press” aspect of the Free 
Speech and Press Clause was meant to “clarify” or to “remove doubt” as to the First 
Amendment protection for speech technologies.  Cf. Amar, supra note 137, at 12.   
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2. Historical evidence from the First Congress and 
the Copyright Act of 1790 
 
My understanding of the relationship between the Free Press and 
Copyright Clauses is also supported by the First Congress’s enactment of 
the first copyright act.  Exercising its Copyright Clause power, the First 
Congress enacted a copyright statute in 1790 modeled, in large part, on the 
Statute of Anne.152  Like the Statute of Anne, the Copyright Act of 1790 
established a copyright system in which authors received copyrights in their 
works for limited terms of fourteen years (renewable once).153  Like the 
Statute of Anne, the 1790 Act did not attempt to limit or regulate the 
printing presses (as the old Printing Acts in England had).  The copyright 
system established by the First Congress conferred limited exclusive rights 
in works of authorship, but—importantly—not in any of the machines or 
technologies that enabled mass publication.  Against this backdrop, printing 
presses proliferated in the early Republic.  In 1790, the nation had 
approximately 100 newspapers, a number that would double by the end of 
the decade.154  As Thomas Nachbar describes, “in 1798 the fledgling 
republic had more than 200 publishers, printers, and booksellers spread 
through New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, and 
they were intensely competitive.”155 
 
This traditional model of copyright—with its avoidance of any 
limits on speech technologies—was followed for over 200 years in the 
United States.  From 1790 to 1992, every single U.S. copyright ever enacted 
stayed clear of any direct regulation of the machines that enabled mass 
copying and publication.156  While the U.S. system had a manufacturing 
clause from 1891 to 1986 that required foreign authors to print their books 
with U.S. printers, the provision did not regulate in any way the printing 
machines in the U.S., or who could print what in the U.S.157  Instead, the 
manufacturing clause required foreigners to make use of U.S. printers, 
                                                 
152  Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Whitmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 650 (1943) (“As 
might have been expected, this Act reflected its historical antecedents.”). 
153  Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124.  Patterson argued that the Copyright Clause’s 
specification of “authors” for the exclusive rights to their writings “most likely reflect[s] an 
intent not to give Congress the power to make a law regulating the press.”  Patterson, Free 
Speech, supra note 11, at 32. 
154  STEWART, supra note 113, at 16. 
155  Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37, 45 
(2002). 
156  See Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124; Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 322; Act 
of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171; Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436; Act of 
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1106; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1080;  Pub. L. No. 94-
553, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976); see also Patterson, Free Speech, supra note 11, at 35 (noting how 
U.S. copyright law in nineteenth century did not allow control over the printing press). 
157  See Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1106; Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 
1080; Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2572 (1976). 
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whoever they may be and whatever their technology.  It was not until the 
failed Audio Home Recording Act (AHRA) in 1992 that a copyright 
provision attempted to directly regulate a copy technology in the U.S.158    
 
The Supreme Court has also protected this traditional model of 
copyright, viewing attempts to regulate speech technologies as suspect.  As 
Jane Ginsburg has identified, the Supreme Court has traditionally rejected 
attempts of copyright owners to block new technologies.159  In a variety of 
cases over the past 100 years, including the Sony case, the Court has 
demonstrated a “[s]olicitude for . . . nascent dissemination industry,”160 
particularly where copyright holders attempt to stop or otherwise control a 
new technology for disseminating speech.  
 
This over-200-year tradition of copyright’s avoidance of regulating 
speech technologies, which dates back to the First Congress’s enactment of 
the first copyright act, is constitutionally significant in two respects.  First, 
in interpreting the Copyright Clause, the Supreme Court has placed 
importance on the existence of a long tradition in copyright law dating back 
to the First Congress.  Under the First Congress canon of construction,161 
the Supreme Court has long recognized, particularly in the copyright 
context:   
d of nearly a century, it is almost 
conclusive.162 
 the Copyright Clause, ‘a page of history is worth a volume of 
gic.’”163   
 
                                                
 
The construction placed upon the constitution by the first act of 
1790 and the act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with 
its formation, many of whom were members of the convention 
which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight, and when 
it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been 
disputed during a perio
 
In Eldred, the most recent case involving the Copyright Clause, the Court 
reaffirmed this canon, stating:  “To comprehend the scope of Congress’ 
power under
lo
 
158  17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010; see Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
87, 118 (2004) (“[P]erhaps most significantly, the AHRA for the first time expressly 
regulated technology within a particular market.”). 
159  Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of 
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622-26 (2001). 
160  Id. at 1623. 
161  See generally Michael Bhargava, Comment, The First Congress Canon the 
Supreme Court Use of History, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1745 (2006). 
162  Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884). 
163  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003). 
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Second, as this canon reflects, the Court places importance on the 
Framers’ intent to identify the outer parameters of Congress’s power under 
the Copyright Clause.    Given the historical evidence before and at the time 
of the Framing, I believe it is fairly evident that the Framers did not believe 
that Congress had the power to restrict speech technologies through 
copyright law.  The absence of such regulation in the first Copyright Act 
presents an example “where the government conduct at issue was not 
engaged in at the time of adoption . . . [because] it was thought to violate the 
ght embodied in the constitutional guarantee,”164 in this case, the Free 
Press Clause. 
 
3. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free 
re the 
istory of the Free Press Clause,  its cases do support the historical 
understa
ramers adopted 
he press in response to the abuses of the Crown under the 
Printing
 
 and 
17 -century England.  The Printing Act of 1662 had “prescribed 
o limited 
e total number of presses in England,167 which was another means for the 
Crown 
                                                
ri
Press Clause 
 
 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Press Clause has 
tended to focus on the Free Speech Clause or the First Amendment more 
generally for its analysis, without exploring as much the contours of the 
Free Press Clause.  Although the Supreme Court has yet to fully explo
165h
nding of the freedom of the press that I have outlined above.   
 
First, the Supreme Court has recognized that the F
the freedom of t
 Acts.  As Justice Scalia explained in a recent case: 
 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of “the freedom of speech, or of 
the press” prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints 
upon expression, but the core abuse against which it was directed 
was the scheme of licensing laws implemented by the monarch and 
Parliament to contain the “evils” of the printing press in 16th-
th
what could be printed, who could print, and who could sell.”166 
 
Justice Scalia could have added that the Printing Act of 1662 als
th
to control piracy and heresy.  
 
 
164  McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm’n., 514 U.S. 334, 372 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  
165  The most extensive historical discussion can be found in two concurring opinions, 
one by Justice Thomas and the other by the late Chief Justice Burger.  See id. at  334, 358 
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 
(1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
166  Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
167  See SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 238. 
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In addition, the Court has recognized the centrality of the printing 
press to the First Amendment.  In rejecting a ban on leafletting on public 
streets, the Court characterized the freedoms of speech and of the press as 
encomp sing the “freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information 
or opini
cognized that “[t]he 
press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication 
which a
rt’s precedents discussing the Free Press Clause are consistent with 
                                                
as
on.”168     
 
Furthermore, the Court has taken a very broad view of the freedom 
of press, consistent with the historical understanding.  Although the 
Supreme Court has at times referred to journalists or newspapers as “the 
press” in the modern sense,169 its cases have never limited the freedom of 
the press to just journalists.  Instead, the Court has re
ffords a vehicle of information and opinion.”170 
 
Perhaps most importantly, the Court has recognized that the 
freedom of the press encompasses other speech technologies that have 
developed after the printing press.  As the Court stated in United States v. 
Paramount Pictures,171 “We have no doubt that moving pictures, like 
newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”172  Although the Supreme Court has 
more recently analyzed regulations of speech technologies under the Free 
Speech Clause (or more generally under the First Amendment without 
delineation between the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press),173 
the Cou
 
168  Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (emphasis added). 
169  See, e.g., Minnesota Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 581 (1983); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1974); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698-99 (1972). 
170  Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (emphasis added).  Cf. Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 104, 134  (1992)  (“[T]he First Amendment yokes the freedom of speech to the freedom 
of the press and thereby signals an intent to embrace all communication, regardless of the 
precise medium of transmission.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study 
in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 905 (“[T]he enumerated rights of 
“speech” and “press”—and the broader structural logic of the Constitution’s scheme of 
republican self-government—imply that this nonenumerated form of political expression 
must likewise be a right retained by members of the self-governing citizenry.”). 
171  334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). 
172  Id.; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (freedom of the press includes “the right 
of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph as much as of the large 
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods”) 
173  See, e.g., Red Lion Broad., Co.  v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).  Whether the 
Supreme Court should rely on the Free Press Clause (separate from the Free Speech Clause) I 
leave for future inquiry.  One could argue that as long as the Free Speech Clause is 
understood to cover whatever the Free Press Clause would cover, the Court’s current 
approach is acceptable.  Cf. Amar, supra note 137, at 18 (“I suspect that we would pretty 
much use the First Amendment in the same way, using the speech clause to pick up whatever 
slack was created by the absence of a press clause.”).   
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the historical understanding of the freedom of the press I have outlined 
 
. The Sony Safe Harbor Is a First Amendment Safeguard that 
urt’s more general reluctance (or perhaps failure) to 
lumb the historical origin of the Free Press Clause in the context of First 
Amendm
 it, copyright law’s 
attempts to regulate technologies would likely violate the First Amendment, 
or, at the very least, require First Amendment scrutiny.  
                                                
above. 
II
Protects the Freedom of the Press 
 
 The historical connection between the Copyright Clause and the 
Free Press Clause I have outlined above has been largely overlooked in 
legal scholarship.  Although many scholars have written about the history of 
each Clause separately, few have drawn any direct connection between the 
two Clauses.174  Patterson and Joyce’s essay published in 2003 appears to be 
the first piece of legal scholarship that attempts to draw this direct 
connection.  Yet even their insightful essay fails to discuss the significance 
of the documentary evidence of the Framers’ debate over the relationship 
between the Copyright Clause and the Free Press Clause.175  Perhaps even 
more surprisingly, nor has the Supreme Court.  Even though the Court has 
interpreted the Copyright Clause and its connection to the First 
Amendment,176 the Court has yet to discuss the historical materials related 
to the Free Press Clause as it bears on the Copyright Clause.  This omission 
is reflective of the Co
p
ent claims.   
 
Understanding the history of the Free Press Clause, however, has 
profound consequences for copyright law today.  First, the history 
demonstrates that the Framers viewed the Free Press Clause to impose limits 
on the Copyright Clause power, specifically with respect to regulations of 
technology.  Second, the history and long tradition of copyright law’s 
avoidance of regulating speech technologies, dating back to the first 
Copyright Act of 1790, all confirm the vital importance of the Sony safe 
harbor to copyright law today.  The Sony safe harbor operates as a 
traditional First Amendment safeguard within copyright law that protects 
speech technologies and free press interests.  Without
 
174  Within the scholarship related to the freedom of the press, much of the focus has 
been on the prepublication licensing requirement under the British Crown, a classic prior 
restraint under First Amendment jurisprudence.  This focus has led to the Printing Acts 
sometimes being referred to as “Licensing Acts.”  See Astbury, supra note 28, at 296 (“This 
Printing Act was a comprehensive measure for the control of the press, but it is often referred 
to as the Licensing Act because of its provisions for the prepublication, or, more correctly, 
the preprinting censorship of all forms of printed materials.”).  The Printing Acts required 
more than just licensing, however.  Very little attention has been devoted to the Crown’s 
limit on the total number of presses under the Printing Acts. 
175  Patterson & Joyce, supra note 11, at 942-43.  
176  See infra notes 177-211 and accompanying text. 
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A. First Amendment Limits on the Copyright Clause 
 
The relationship between the First Amendment and copyright law 
has always been a delicate one.  Copyrights restrict speech, keeping others 
from utilizing copyrighted works in a number of ways—not just copying, 
publishing, and performing those works, but even creating new derivative 
works (meaning new expression) based on copyrighted materials.  At the 
same time, however, the Copyright Clause of the Constitution clearly 
anticipated that Congress would establish a system of copyright in the U.S. 
to grant authors exclusive rights over their writings.  And, when the Framers 
drafted the First Amendment in the Bill of Rights, the Framers must have 
thought that copyright can coexist with the First Amendment.177  But how 
can it, 
 
f First Amendment safeguards—
the Harper Court’s First Amendment solution to 
’s book had even been published.   The Court, 
however, did not see a First Amendment problem at all in enforcing 
copyrig
sed in Part I 
bove.  Federalist James Iredell, for example, defended the Copyright 
Clause 
                                                
if copyright law restricts speech in so many basic ways? 
1. The doctrine o
copyright law 
 
The Supreme Court’s answer to this conundrum came first in 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.178  In the case, the 
Nation magazine asserted a First Amendment right to publish parts of 
President Ford’s memoirs that it had obtained from a stolen copy of the 
manuscript before Ford 179
ht in this case.   
 
First, copyright law complements the First Amendment, the Court 
explained, by providing the economic incentives for authors to create and 
disseminate works of expression.  In an oft-quoted line from Harper & Row, 
the Court asserted that “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the 
engine of free expression” by giving “the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”180  Although the Court offered no citation to any source, 
historical or otherwise, to support its bare assertion, the Court’s view is 
consistent with the historical evidence from the Framing discus
a
power on similar incentive grounds, as quoted above.181 
 
 
177  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
178  471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
179  Id. at 542-43. 
180  Id. at 558 (emphasis added). 
181  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the Harper Court explained that copyright law can avoid 
further First Amendment problems by incorporating doctrines that protect 
First Amendment interests.  These “First Amendment safeguards” contained 
within copyright law effectively keep copyright law from unduly restricting 
the freedom of speech.  For example, the “idea/expression dichotomy 
‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the 
Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts [or ideas] while 
still protecting an author’s expression.’”182  Also, the fair use doctrine 
accommodates free speech interests by allowing “latitude for scholarship 
and comment” for fair uses of copyrighted works.183  These two copyright 
doctrines operate as “First Amendment protections . . . alread
184
y embodied in 
the Copyright Act[].”   Accordingly, no First Amendment scrutiny is 
ordinari
ides a First Amendment safeguard for libel law by 
setting forth a higher standard of tort liability to accommodate First 
Amendm
standard of liability for libel actions against public officials that allows some 
                                                
ly warranted for an application of copyright law.       
 
The Court did not come up with the doctrine of First Amendment 
safeguards on its own.  In 1970, Paul Goldstein and Melville Nimmer both 
wrote articles—apparently without knowledge of the other’s—that laid the 
groundwork for the doctrine. Goldstein argued that the idea-expression 
dichotomy acted as a “First Amendment safeguard” in the context of 
copyright law.185   Similarly, Nimmer contended that the idea-expression 
dichotomy, for the most part, “represents an acceptable definitional balance 
as between copyright and free speech interests.”186  A definitional balance 
attempts “to draw a line between that speech which may be prohibited under 
copyright law, and that speech which, despite its copyright status, may not 
be abridged under the command of the first amendment.”187  Both Goldstein 
and Nimmer analogized to the actual malice standard under New York Times 
v. Sullivan,188 which prov
ent concerns.189 
 
One important feature of a First Amendment safeguard is that it is 
over-protective of speech.  In drawing the line between protected and 
unprotected speech, a First Amendment safeguard effectively puts a “thumb 
on the scale” for speech to guard against chilling of speech activities.  For 
example, in Sullivan, the Supreme Court devised a First Amendment 
 
182  471 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added). 
183  Id. at 560. 
184  Id. 
185  Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 989, 
1018 (1970). 
186  Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 11, at 1192 (emphasis added). 
187  Id. at 1185. 
188  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
189  Goldstein, supra note 185, at 992, 1000; Nimmer, Copyright, supra note 11, at 
1184-85. 
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libel or false statements to go unremedied if made without actual malice 
(i.e., without knowledge or reckless disregard of the falsity).190  This means 
that negligently made falsehoods about public officials must be allowed, 
even though they are false and even defamatory under traditional standards 
of tort liability.191  A First Amendment safeguard is overprotective of 
speech, in order to create breathing room for expressive activity that might 
otherwise be chilled under a lower standard of liability. As the Court 
explained in Sullivan:  
e to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need … to 
rvive.’”192 
                                                
 
As Madison said, “Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the 
proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than 
in that of the press.” . . . That erroneous statement is inevitable in 
free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression ar
su
  
The idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine operate in 
similar fashion in copyright law.  Even copyrighted expression must often 
yield to free speech interests under these copyright doctrines.  For example, 
in Baker v. Selden, the Court held that accounting forms with a “peculiar 
arrangement of columns and headings” could not be copyrighted because 
the underlying system (or idea) embodied by the forms, which was not 
patented, must be left for the public’s free use.193  Even though the forms 
consisted of a “peculiar arrangement” that probably would have easily 
satisfied the originality requirement for obtaining a copyright as a 
compilation,194 the Court ruled against copyright in order to protect the free 
dissemination of the idea or system of accounting that was embodied in the 
forms.  Subsequent courts have extended the idea-expression dichotomy 
even further in the merger doctrine, under which copyright does not extend 
to original expression if there are so few ways of expressing the same 
concept.195  These doctrines carve out breathing room for the free exchange 
of ideas, even to the point of denying copyrights to original expression.  
Likewise, the fair use doctrine allows people to make unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted works for fair use purposes, such as criticism or comment.  
Even though the early copyright acts did not contain a fair use provision, 
courts have from “the infancy of copyright protection … thought [it] 
 
190  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283-84. 
191  The New York Times v. Sullivan standard provides a prophylactic rule, in that it 
protects some libelous speech in order to encourage free, uninhibited discourse.  See Brian K. 
Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 
66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 934-35 (1999). 
192  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271. 
193  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1880). 
194  Cf. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1991) (pitching form 
potentially copyrightable). 
195  Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). 
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necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.’”196  Fair use allows what otherwise would be 
considered copyright infringement to go free, in the name of free speech 
interests.  In cases of parody fair use, the Court has even recognized that the 
parody can destroy the entire value of the copyrighted work, “kill[ing] 
emand for the original,” and still be a permissible fair use.197    
 
2. 
mendment scrutiny 
                                                        
First Amendment scrutiny is necessary 
r an application of copyright law: 
 
ction, further First Amendment scrutiny is 
unnecessary.200 
 
ht to make their own speech without burden from the 
governm nt. 
                                                
d
The traditional contours of copyright—Eldred’s 
elaboration of when First A
is required of copyright law 
                                                                                                                     
 Harper was not the Court’s final word on the First Amendment and 
copyright law.  Some lower courts had mistakenly interpreted Harper to 
mean that copyrights are “categorically immune from challenges under the 
First Amendment.”198  In Eldred,199 the Court rejected that notion, but 
concluded that the First Amendment safeguards in copyright law typically 
obviate the need for First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law.  In a key 
passage, the Court explained when 
fo
The [copyright term extension] . . . does not oblige anyone to 
reproduce another’s speech against the carrier’s will.  [1] Instead, it 
protects authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.  
Protection of that order does not raise free speech concerns present 
when [2] the government compels or burdens the communication of 
particular facts or ideas.  To the extent such assertions raise First 
Amendment concerns, copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards 
are generally adequate to address them.  We recognize that the D.C. 
Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights “categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.”  But when, 
as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of 
copyright prote
In this passage, the Eldred Court appears to distinguish between two 
types of cases:  (1) cases involving individuals asserting the right to use 
copyrighted expression of others, and (2) cases involving individuals not 
asserting the right to use copyrighted expression of others, but instead 
having a rig
e
 
196  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994). 
197  Id. at 591-92. 
198  Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
199  537 U.S. 186 (2002). 
200  Id. at 221 (bracketed numbers inserted). 
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In what I call Category 1 cases, “speakers assert the right to make 
[use of] other people’s [copyrighted] speeches,” as was the case in both 
Harper and Eldred.201  In a Category 1 case, as long as “Congress has not 
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,” no First 
Amendment scrutiny is required.  Why?  Because the First Amendment 
safeguards in copyright law are deemed to have provided sufficient 
accommodation for First Amendment interests of users of copyrighted 
content.  On the other hand, First Amendment scrutiny is required in a 
Category 1 case if the traditional contours of copyright protection have been 
altered.  
striction, which 
necessit strict scrutiny under the Court’s precedents.205 
 way changed, First Amendment scrutiny of copyright 
law is unnecessary.   
                                                
202
 
In Category 2 cases, the government burdens or compels an 
individual’s right to make her own speech (without copying the copyrighted 
works of others without authorization), as was the case with cable providers 
in Turner Broadcasting who were obligated under the “must carry” 
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act to carry certain local programming.203  In a Category 2 case, some level 
of First Amendment scrutiny applies; in Turner it was intermediate 
scrutiny.204  The Eldred Court described Turner as raising a more serious 
First Amendment question because cable operators were being forced by 
law to carry the content of others (network broadcasters).  Although the 
Eldred Court did not discuss it, we could easily imagine a copyright law that 
would require strict scrutiny.  For example, imagine that Congress enacted a 
law that denied copyrights based on content or even viewpoint to works that 
supported Osama Bin Laden or that contained sexually indecent 
photographs.  In this case, the individual’s right to make her own speech 
would be burdened by a viewpoint or content-based re
ates 
 
The more typical copyright infringement suit would fall within the 
Category 1 cases, however.  In most cases, the enforcement of copyrights 
does not raise any First Amendment problems—or even require any First 
Amendment scrutiny—given the existence of First Amendment safeguards 
within copyright law.  Unless the traditional contours of copyright 
protection are in some
 
 
201  Id. at 221. 
202  See Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual 
Property and Free Speech in the “Digital Millennium,” 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1349 (2005).   
203  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (plurality). 
204  Id. at 661-62. 
205  Id. at 642. 
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Thus, under Eldred, the “traditional contours of copyright” is the 
key concept for determining if a copyright law requires First Amendment 
scrutiny in Category 1 cases.  If Congress has “altered the traditional 
contours of copyright protection,” further First Amendment scrutiny is 
necessary.  Unfortunately, the Eldred Court said very little about the 
meaning of “traditional contours of copyright protection” or its relationship 
to the F
gated either doctrine, 
First Amendment scrutiny would be required (and it is very likely that such 
a chang
by granting 
super-copyright protections or sui generis rights without formally altering 
one of t
                                                
irst Amendment safeguards, so we are left to much guesswork.   
 
With that caveat in mind, I argue that the concept of “traditional 
contours of copyright protection” includes (i) the traditional First 
Amendment safeguards in copyright law and (ii) other traditional copyright 
doctrines.  As to the first category, all traditional First Amendment 
safeguards within copyright law (such as fair use and idea-expression, the 
two safeguards the Court has expressly noted) fall within the category of 
“traditional contours of copyright.”  If Congress abro
e in copyright law would be unconstitutional). 
 
As to the second category, I believe there may be other traditional 
copyright doctrines besides the traditional First Amendment safeguards, 
such as the basic exclusive rights of copyright.206  Thus, First Amendment 
scrutiny would be necessary either if Congress altered a traditional First 
Amendment safeguard such as fair use and idea-expression, or if Congress 
changed a traditional contour of copyright protection, such as 
he First Amendment safeguards within copyright law.    
 
My interpretation is supported by several passages in Eldred.  First, 
the language contained in “traditional First Amendment safeguards” and 
“traditional contours of copyright protection” are different.  While both 
contain the notion of “traditional,” the former term focuses on First 
Amendment safeguards—which are typically exemptions to copyright, such 
as fair use and idea-expression.  The latter term focuses on the contours of 
copyright protection—which could include the exclusive rights of the 
copyright holder,207 instead of just exemptions to copyrights.  Indeed, when 
 
206  Cf. Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 491-
500 (2004) (arguing that prior formalities of U.S. copyright law dating back to the first 
Copyright Act constitute a “traditional contour of copyright protection”); Lawrence Lessig, 
Creative Economies, 1 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 41 (2006) (same).  The Ninth Circuit rejected a 
First Amendment challenge based on this argument.  Kahle. v. Gonzales, --- F.3d ----, 2007 
WL 136727 (9th Cir. Jan. 22, 2007). 
207  See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright 
Claims, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 673, 687 (2003) (“If Congress had expanded the substantive rights 
enjoyed by copyright holders, thereby altering the ‘traditional’ balance between the rights of 
copyright holders and others, the Court would have taken a far dimmer view of extending 
copyright’s duration.”). 
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one thinks of copyright protection, one probably thinks first of the basic 
exclusive rights of the copyright holder—i.e., the protections copyright 
affords the copyright holder—instead of exemptions or exceptions to those 
rights.  
omm., a case in which the Court upheld the grant of 
stronger trademark rights over the term “Olympic” to the U.S. Olympic 
Commi
ea-expression in 
that section, which leads up to the introduction of the concept of “traditional 
contour
peech is not broader than necessary to protect the 
legitimate congressional interest and therefore does not violate the First 
Amendm
                                                
   
 
This subtle distinction between First Amendment safeguards and 
copyright protection is illuminated by the Eldred Court’s citation of case 
law.  Immediately after introducing the concept of “traditional contours of 
copyright protection,” the Court cited two cases:  (1) a direct cite to Harper 
& Row, to the passage where the Court discussed the “First Amendment 
protections already embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the 
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use”;208 
and (2) a comparative cite to San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United 
States Olympic C
ssion.209   
 
The Eldred Court’s first cite to Harper & Row makes clear that the 
Court considers the traditional First Amendment safeguards within 
copyright law to comprise part of the “traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”  Indeed, the entire discussion of fair use and id
s,” leaves practically no doubt about this point.210   
 
But the Eldred Court’s second cite to the “Olympic” trademark case 
is also instructive.  The case involved a First Amendment challenge to a 
statute211 that gave stronger-than-usual trademark rights over the word 
“Olympic” to the United States Olympic Committee.  The statute did not 
require proof of a likelihood of confusion for a successful trademark claim 
as is required under the Lanham Act for trademark claims; nor did it allow 
the typical defenses to trademark infringement.  The Supreme Court upheld 
the statute, but only after applying First Amendment scrutiny.  As the Court 
explained:  “Even though this protection may exceed the traditional rights 
of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the application of the Act to 
this commercial s
ent.”212   
 
 
208  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) 
(emphasis added). 
209  483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
210  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003). 
211  The Amateur Sports Act, § 10, 92 Stat. 3048 (codified at 36 U.S.C. § 380).  
212  United States Olympic Comm’n, 483 U.S. at 530 (emphasis added). 
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If we applied a similar approach to copyright, a court would apply 
First Amendment scrutiny to a copyright law that altered the traditional 
scope of copyright by granting a super-copyright to some works.  Even 
though no formal alteration of a First Amendment safeguard such as fair use 
or idea-expression has occurred, there has been a change to the traditional 
contours of copyright, necessitating First Amendment review.  To borrow 
the language from the Olympic case, “this protection may exceed the 
traditional rights of a [copyright] owner.”  In such case, a court would apply 
First Amendme rutin
    
3. The Free Press Clause limit on the Copyright 
ree 
Speech or Free Press Clauses.  But neither case involved any regulation of 
speech t
upreme Court 
eventually considers a case involving the constitutionality of a law 
restricti
First Amendment safeguard to accommodate 
ree Press concerns to protect speech technologies.  In the next section, I 
show ho
 
. The Sony Safe Harbor Is a Traditional First 
nt sc y.  
Clause 
 
The Supreme Court has yet to consider whether the Free Press 
Clause imposes any limits on Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause.  
In both Harper and Eldred, the Court spoke generally of the “First 
Amendment,” without delineating or even mentioning either the F
echnologies, so no Free Press Clause issue was even presented. 
 
In the future, though, it seems very likely that the Court will have to 
consider the constitutionality of a copyright law that restricts a speech 
technology, given the increased pressure in Congress to use copyright law to 
regulate technologies.  In Part I, I sketched out the history of the Free Press 
Clause, which I believe indicates that the Framers understood the Clause as 
limiting Congress’s power to regulate speech technologies through 
copyright law.  This history can no longer be ignored, if the S
ng a speech technology under copyright or other law.  
 
The Court’s doctrine of First Amendment safeguards suggests, 
however, that the Court may be reluctant to entertain a direct Free Press or 
First Amendment challenge to a copyright provision.  Instead, the Court 
probably will seek first to examine whether copyright law already provides 
some definitional balance or 
F
w it already does.     
C
Amendment Safeguard 
 
My core thesis, developed below, is that the Sony doctrine serves as 
a traditional First Amendment safeguard to protect the same interests as the 
original understanding of the freedom of the press.  As such, the Sony safe 
harbor has constitutional importance for our copyright system at least of the 
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same degree as the fair use and idea-expression doctrines—although I leave 
for another day whether the Sony safe harbor is constitutionally required. 
The Son afe harbor provides a definitional balance to address free press 
concern
    
y copyright holders.  The two movie studios in Sony, 
niversal and Disney, were seeking to shut down the sale of all Sony video 
recorde
erguson, who presided over the trial, well understood that 
the movie studios’ argument implicated not just the VCR, but many other 
technolo
f deemed sufficient as a basis for liability, would 
expand the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial 
gizing to the staple article of commerce 
octrine from patent law.   In what has become probably the most quoted 
passage
 
                                                
y s
s in copyright law.  
 1. The Sony safe harbor 
 
 In Sony, the movie studios staked out a copyright claim that was, in 
the Supreme Court’s view, “unprecedented.”213  It was unprecedented in 
that never before had copyright law been invoked to “impose copyright 
liability upon the distributors of copying equipment,” in this case, Sony’s 
newly developed betamax or video recorder.214  Although the home video 
recorder was relatively new at the time, other copying equipment, starting 
with the printing press, had existed for generations—without such attempted 
interference b
U
rs.215  
 
Judge F
gies:   
 
Selling a staple article of commerce, e.g., a typewriter, a recorder, a 
camera, a photocopying machine technically contributes to any 
infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 
“contribution,” i
management.216 
 
 The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Ferguson’s decision, even 
adopting his approach in analo
217d
 in Sony, the Court held: 
The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance 
between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective—not 
merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the 
rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of 
 
213  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
214  Id. 
215  Id. at 420 (plaintiffs sought “an injunction against the manufacture and marketing 
of Betamax VTR’s”). 
216  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 461 
(C.D. Cal. 1979). 
217  Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. 
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commerce.  Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the 
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory 
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
he 
o studios would be harmed by such recordings, as well as the societal 
at was much narrower 
an the industries sought.  Most importantly, the Court reaffirmed the basic 
tenet of
taken 
y them] to foster infringement.”   Active inducement can be shown, for 
                            
substantial noninfringing uses.218 
 
Thus, in order for the Sony doctrine to apply, the technology must be 
“capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.”219  The video 
recorder easily satisfied this test, in the Court’s view, because it allowed 
consumers to record broadcast shows for “time-shifting” purposes to record 
and later to watch a show.220  The two movie studios had no legitimate 
claim to stop all other copyright holders—such as Fred Rogers from Mr. 
Rogers’ Neighborhood—who had no objection to allowing consumers to 
make such time-shift recordings of their shows.221  Even further, the Court 
held that the two studios had no legitimate claim to stop time-shift 
recordings of their own broadcast shows, even if consumers recorded them 
without the studios’ authorization.222  Such time shift recording was a fair 
use, the Court concluded.  The Court noted the lack of any evidence that t
tw
interest in having greater access to broadcast programs that were freely 
televised.223 
 
 In 2005, the Court revisited the Sony doctrine in Grokster, a case 
involving the liability of two distributors of p2p software that enabled users 
to engage in “file sharing” over the Internet, including for illegal copying of 
copyrighted music. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the music and 
movie industries that summary judgment had been improperly granted to the 
defendants, the Court based its decision on a ruling th
th
 the Sony doctrine, and strengthened, I believe, its foundation by 
describing it, for the first time, as a “safe harbor.”224   
 
But the Court also made clear that the Sony safe harbor did not 
immunize technology developers from liability if they “actively induced” 
infringement, “as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
225[b
                     
 442. 
 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 n.12 
5). 
218  Id. at
219  Id.  
220  Id. 
221  Id. at 446. 
222  Id. at 447-48. 
223  Id. at 454-55. 
224  
(200
225  Id. at 2770. 
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example, by advertising or providing instructions encouraging or advising 
consumers to use the product in question for infringing purposes.226     
 
 The Sony safe harbor, in other words, does not create complete 
immunity.227  Instead, the Sony safe harbor protects (1) the developer of a 
technology capable of a substantial noninfringing use for acts in designing, 
eveloping, distributing, and supporting the technology; but does not protect 
(2) the d
ts 
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical 
support
y and 
rokster provides a sensible approach to secondary liability, one that is 
sensitiv
the needs of m for “the 
development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.”231   
 
d
eveloper for any other conduct that demonstrates an intent or active 
step of inducement. 
 
The Court was careful in ensuring that the inducement claim not be 
allowed to water down the Sony safe harbor.  A defendant’s “mere 
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be 
enough here to subject a distributor to liability.”228  “[O]rdinary ac
 or product updates,” cannot in themselves be considered active 
inducement.229  Culpable intent cannot be imputed from a “product’s 
characteristics.”230   
 
On the whole, I believe the Court’s framework in Son
G
e to the needs of copyright holders in enforcing their copyrights and 
technology developers to have breathing roo
2. The Sony safe harbor protects speech-facilitating 
technologies and free press concerns 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly described the Sony 
doctrine as a First Amendment safeguard—and no prior legal scholarship 
about Sony has even suggested it—the conclusion necessarily follows, I 
                                                 
226  Id. at 2779. 
227  The Supreme Court appeared to suggest, if not hold, that the Sony safe harbor 
applies to vicarious liability (in addition to contributory liability).  Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 n.17 
(1982) (“[R]easoned analysis of respondents’ unprecedented claim necessarily entails 
consideration of arguments and case law which may also be forwarded under other labels.”); 
see also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776 n.9.  The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that Sony 
does not apply to shield a defendant against vicarious liability.  A&M Records v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (Sony “provides a defense only to contributory 
infringement, not to vicarious infringement”).  The Seventh Circuit takes the opposite view. 
See In re Aimster Copyright Ltgn., 334 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Court, treating 
vicarious and contributory infringement interchangeably, … held that Sony was not a 
vicarious infringer either.”). 
228  Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
229  Id.  
230  Id. at 2779. 
231  Id. at 2780. 
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believe, from the principles the Court has adopted.  At least on the surface, 
such a claim may seem surprising.  After all, when the Supreme Court first 
articulated the Sony safe harbor, the Court analogized to a provision in the 
moreover, that both the fair use and idea-expression doctrines were 
not form  characterized as First Amendment safeguards until the Harper 
decision
t that the Sony doctrine is 
one of “copyright’s internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment 
concern
 First Amendment concerns.  
It leaves breathing room for the development of those technologies that can 
facilitat
                                                
Patent Code, which limits contributory patent infringement from proscribing 
the mere sale of a “staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use.”232  But the Sony Court made no mention of 
any First Amendment safeguard.  Nor did the Court in Grokster. 
 
 I believe the Court’s silence was understandable, however.  At the 
time of the Sony case, the Supreme Court had yet to even articulate the 
doctrine of First Amendment safeguards for any copyright doctrine.233  And, 
although one of the fifty-five amici briefs in Grokster did raise the issue,234 
none of the courts below or parties’ briefs did.   It is important to bear in 
mind, 
ally
 in 1985, many years after they had been in existence in copyright 
law.  These cases show that First Amendment safeguards can operate within 
copyright law without being formally recognized as such by the Court until 
later. 
 
If we test the Sony doctrine under Eldred’s definition of a First 
Amendment safeguard, I believe it becomes eviden
s.”235  The First Amendment interest lies in allowing the 
development of technologies that facilitate the widespread production and 
dissemination of speech, technologies that I call “speech-facilitating 
technologies” or “speech technologies” for short.   
 
The Sony safe harbor protects technologies, like the recorder, 
copier, and printing press, that facilitate the dissemination of speech.  By 
providing a safe harbor for the development of such speech-facilitating 
technologies, the Sony doctrine accommodates
e the production and dissemination of speech.  As long as a 
technology in question has a substantial noninfringing use, it falls within the 
Sony safe harbor and is protected from copyright claims—even if the 
technology can also be used for infringement. 
 
 
232  Sony, 464 U.S. at 440. 
233  Harper & Row was decided in 1985, a year after Sony, so the Court had yet to 
consider the doctrine of First Amendment safeguards in copyright law at the time of Sony. 
234  Brief of Professors Edward Lee, Peter Shane, & Peter Swire as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 
2764 (2005), 2005 WL 508111. 
235  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 n.24 (2003). 
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Notice that the Sony safe harbor has all the hallmarks shared by the 
other First Amendment safeguards already discussed.  First, it establishes a 
standard of liability and a definitional balance for copyright law.  The 
definitional balance consists of a “balance between a copyright holder’s 
legitimate demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the 
statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially 
unrelated areas of commerce.”  Those other areas of commerce involve the 
development of speech-facilitating technologies.  Sony itself recognized the 
First Amendment interests at stake. In rejecting the movie studios’ attempt 
to stop Sony’s production of the video recorder, the Court emphasized 
several times the public’s interest in the video recorder, which could 
increase the viewing public’s access to broadcast shows.236  The video 
recorder allows people to make “time shift” recordings of broadcast show 
for later viewing, a practice that the Court ultimately concluded was a fair 
use.  Just as there is a free speech interest in allowing people to make fair 
uses of
logies.  In fact, the balance struck by the 
by the Sullivan Court: “Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper 
use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the 
 copyrighted works, so too there is a free speech (or free press) 
interest in allowing the production of technologies that make those fair uses 
even possible.  For, without the video recorder, no one in Sony could have 
made any fair use recordings whatsoever.237    
 
Second, just like the New York Times v. Sullivan standard for libel, 
the Sony safe harbor is overprotective of speech.  Even though a technology 
can be used—and, in fact, is used—for copyright infringement, the Sony 
safe harbor allows the development and distribution of the technology as 
long as it is capable of a substantial noninfringing use.  The Court made it 
clear that it looks to both actual and potential uses of a technology, and a 
potential use that is commercially significant is enough.238  Although four 
dissenting justices in Sony would have adopted a more restrictive test 
finding liability if a technology’s primary (actual) use is for copyright 
infringement,239 the majority adopted a definitional balance that was far 
more protective of speech techno
Sony Court is reminiscent of Madison’s view of the printing press, as quoted 
                                                 
236  As noted by the Supreme Court, the district court found that the video recorder 
“served the public interest in increasing access to television programming, an interest that is 
consistent with the First Amendment policy of providing the fullest possible access to 
information through public airwaves.”  Sony, 464 U.S. at 425 (internal quotations omitted).  
ence”); id. at 454 (“public interest in making television 
dcast ailable”). 
st the sale of machines that make such 
use]
un, J. , dissenting). 
The Supreme Court relied on this view in its decision.  Id. at 421 (“‘time shifting’[] enlarges 
the television viewing audi
broa ing more av
237  Id. at 456 (rejecting “a flat prohibition again
[fair  copying possible”). 
238  Id. at 442. 
239  Id. at 491, 493 (Blackm
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press.”2
                                              
until ver  recently, no Copyright Act, starting with the first act of 1790, ever 
attempt
t allow copyright holders to regulate technologies, such as a 
copying device.243  As the Court in Sony put it, “[s]uch an expansion of the 
copyrig
40  The Sony Court itself even noted the role the printing press had in 
the development of copyright.241 
                                                                                                                               
The thornier question is whether the Sony safe harbor can be 
considered a traditional First Amendment safeguard or contour of copyright 
protection.  While both the fair use and idea-expression doctrines can be 
traced back to the 19th century, the Court did not formally recognize the 
Sony doctrine until the late 20th century, in 1984 by the Supreme Court and 
in 1979 by the district court.  By this measure, in terms of formal judicial 
recognition, the Sony doctrine might appear to lack the longevity necessary 
to be considered a “traditional” safeguard.  But, upon closer inspection, the 
Sony doctrine may reflect more of the “tradition” of our copyright system 
than one may think.  One of the reasons the Sony doctrine was not formally 
recognized until 1984 was the simple fact that, prior to Sony, no court had 
ever had the opportunity to consider such an “unprecedented attempt to 
impose copyright liability upon the distributors of copying equipment.”242  
Before Sony, copyright holders had never tried to stop the manufacture of a 
technology under copyright law—certainly not the printing press.  And, 
y
ed, in any way, to regulate directly the printing press or other 
speech-facilitating technologies, much less stop their production.   
 
Even though the Sony doctrine was not formally recognized by the 
Court until 1984, I believe it is historically accurate to say that one of the 
“traditional contours of copyright protection” in the United States was that 
copyright did no
ht privilege is beyond the limits of the grants authorized by 
Congress.”244   
 
The reason for this historical limit to copyright’s scope traces back 
to the freedom of the press, as discussed at length above.  This concept 
informed the Framers, who drafted both the Copyright Clause and the Free 
Press Clause.  The Framers wanted to prevent “the scheme of licensing laws 
implemented by the monarch and Parliament to contain the ‘evils’ of the 
printing press in 16th- and 17th- century England.”245  The Printing Act had 
limited the number of presses and master printers as a part of the repressive 
regime that gave the Stationers control over the entire printing industry.  
                                                 
240  New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)). 
241  Sony, 464 U.S. at 430. 
242  Id. at 421.   
243  Id. 
244  Id. 
245  Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002). 
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That monopoly included power not only over what could be published, but 
over the technology of mass publication itself.  This regulation of the press 
was dis antled when the Printing Act was allowed to lapse and eventually a 
reforme
ideo recorder, the 
copy machine, peer-to-peer file sharing software, etc.—involve the 
product
 that the Printing Act limited the number of 
printing presses in England, all in an effort to control “piracy.”  The Sony 
                                                
m
d system of limited copyrights was instituted in its place.  Under the 
reformed system of copyright, the state did not attempt to give authors (or 
publishers) any control over the technology of the printing press.  There 
was, in other words, the beginning of a freedom of the press.   
 
The Sony safe harbor serves the same interest today.  While the 
Grokster Court was right to recognize that the doctrine “leaves breathing 
room for innovation and a vigorous commerce,”246 it could have said more:  
the Sony doctrine leaves breathing room for innovation and a vigorous 
commerce specifically in speech-facilitating technologies.  All of the 
technologies at issue under the Sony safe harbor—the v
ion or dissemination of works of expression.  By definition, 
copyrighted works involve expression or speech, so technologies that copy, 
publish, or disseminate copyrighted works all necessarily involve speech, 
and all necessarily implicate First Amendment values.      
 
Indeed, the facts in Sony closely approximate the kind of historical 
abuse that the freedom of the press was designed to end.  During the 1980s, 
the movie studios were hoping to market the videodisc player, a technology 
that could play, but not record, shows—a limitation in technology that was 
attractive to the movie studios, which feared copyright infringement of their 
works.247  In fact, a major developer of the videodisc player was MCA, 
which owned Universal Studios, one of the plaintiffs in Sony that was 
seeking to prohibit the manufacture of the competing betamax player 
manufactured by Sony, which, of course, could record.248  Had Universal 
Studios been successful in enjoining Sony from manufacturing the betamax, 
Universal would have been able to limit the number of video recorders in 
the market in the same way
Court viewed the movie studio’s claim as so “extraordinary” because they 
were “seek[ing], in effect, to declare VTR’s contraband.”249  One might 
add: in the same way that the Stationers were able to declare unregistered 
printing presses contraband. 
 
 
246  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 , 2778 
(2005). 
247  Randall Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and 
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHIC. L. REV. 281, 290 (2003). 
248  J. LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: A MACHINE AND THE COMMOTION IT CAUSED 26-30, 
119, 316-328 (1987). 
249  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
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 Copyright liability has First Amendment safeguards.  The Court has 
identified two of them, the fair use and idea-expression doctrines, which 
together provide breathing room for individuals to use copyrighted works 
without authorization.  In this Part, I have made the case for why the Sony 
fe harbor operates as a comparable First Amendment safeguard within 
rig iduals to develop speech-
cilitating technologies.  Whereas fair use and idea-expression focus on 
tections, First Amendment scrutiny would be 
required—with particular recognition of the Framers’ view of the Free Press 
Clause. ond
First Amendme
speech technolo free press principles for courts to 
onsider when applying Sony. 
 Congress enacts a copyright law that regulates technology outside 
of Sony
technologies that facilitate the production or dissemination of speech are 
sa
copy ht law to allow breathing room for indiv
fa
speech itself, the Sony safe harbor focuses on protecting those technologies 
that make mass publication of speech even possible. 
 
III. Applying the Freedom of the Press 2.0 
 
 My theory has important ramifications for copyright law today.  
First, to the extent Congress attempts to operate outside of the Sony safe 
harbor and departs from its pro
  Sec , in applying the Sony safe harbor, courts must consider its 
nt goal of providing breathing room for the development of 
gies.  I propose four 
c
 
A. Copyright Regulations of Speech Technologies Outside 
of the Sony Safe Harbor Must Be Subject to First 
Amendment Scrutiny 
 
If
’s protection as a First Amendment safeguard, First Amendment 
scrutiny would be required.250 Also, courts must take into account the 
Framers’ view of the Free Press Clause as a limit on the Copyright Clause 
power. 
 
Under First Amendment jurisprudence, governmental restrictions on 
subject to some form of First Amendment scrutiny.  From the printing 
press251 to broadcast radio252 to cable television253 to the Internet,254 the 
                                                 
250  The DMCA is one such example.  It goes beyond the scope of this Article to 
analyze how the DMCA would fare under First Amendment scrutiny.  The few courts that 
have considered various First Amendment challenges to the DMCA have all upheld the 
statute as constitutional.  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453-59 
Cir. n Mayer 
ay Patterson compared the DMCA 
Version 
e Lic
 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 253 (1974). 
(2d 2001) (applying intermediate scrutiny); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwy
Studios, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099-1103 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same); United States v. Elcom 
Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (same).  L. R
to the Licensing Act of 1662 in England.  L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modern 
of th ensing Act of 1662, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33 (2002).  I reserve judgment. 
251  See
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Supreme Court has been solicitous in recognizing how technologies of 
speech—and governmental regulations of them—implicate important First 
Amendment concerns.  Typically, the question for the Court is what level of 
First Amendment scrutiny should apply to governmental regulation of a 
speech-related technology, not whether there should be any scrutiny at all.  
Except for government regulation of broadcast media, which have been 
scrutinized under a more lenient (and controversial) standard due to a once 
perceived technological difference in broadcasting,255 laws that regulate 
speech-facilitating technologies
256
 are typically subject to ordinary First 
Amendment scrutiny.   And even with broadcast regulations, some First 
Amendm
 “not 
                                                                                                                 
ent scrutiny applies.    
 
Indeed, restrictions as seemingly minor as regulations on the use of 
loudspeakers or sound amplifiers in public are subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny.257  In Kovacs v. Cooper, the Supreme Court upheld, as reasonable, 
a city ordinance that barred “sound trucks with broadcasts of public interest, 
amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of 
municipalities.”258  The Court noted that sound trucks were allowed “in 
places such as parks or other open spaces off the streets.”259  This city 
ordinance contrasted with the one in Saia v. New York, which prohibited all 
sound trucks used “for advertising … or for the purpose of attracting the 
attention of the passing public,” anywhere in public.260  The Court easily 
concluded that this flat prohibition was unconstitutional because it was
 
252  
254  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 
been roundly criticized as no longer, if ever, true.  See, e.g., Yoo, supra 
 10, a
wnership rules), and ‘must carry’ 
 television providers”). 
6 U.S. at 87. 
.S. at 558. 
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); National Broad. Co. v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). 
253  See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994) (plurality). 
566 (2002). 
255  The Court has attempted to justify the deferential standard for broadcasting based 
on (i) the premise that the spectrum available for broadcasting is scarce, thus justifying 
governmental intervention; and (ii) the “pervasiveness” of broadcast reception in the privacy 
of homes that does not allow viewers to readily screen out content before they are seen.  See 
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality).  
Both rationales have 
note t 266-306. 
256  Turner I, 512 U.S. at 637. 
257  See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 78 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 
559 (1948); see also Michael J. Burstein, Note, Towards a New Standard for First 
Amendment Review of Structural Media Regulation, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1030, 1037-38 & nn. 
42-49 (2004) (cataloguing cases in which First Amendment scrutiny applied to “limits on 
local telephone companies’ provision of video services, surcharges on non-locally produced 
cable programming, municipalities’ grants of exclusive local cable franchises, open access 
requirements for cable Internet service provision, limits on cable channel allocation to 
affiliated programmers (vertical ownership rules), limits on the total number of subscribers 
that can be served by a single cable provider (horizontal o
requirements as applied to satellite
258  Kovacs, 33
259  Id. at 85. 
260  Saia, 334 U
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narrowly drawn to regulate the hours or places of use of loud-speakers, or 
the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted.”261 
 
These cases embody the Court’s larger First Amendment concern in 
protecting outlets of communication for the free flow of information and 
ideas.262  As the Court recognized in Sullivan, the First Amendment guards 
against “shut[ting] off an important outlet for the promulgation of 
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to 
publishing facilities—who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even 
though they are not members of the press.”263  The First Amendment 
attempts “to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources.’”264  In Sullivan, the Court recognized that 
the standards of liability may be “deficient for failure to provide the 
safegua
chnologies under copyright law, the Sony safe harbor acts as 
ne such First Amendment safeguard—or definitional balance—within 
pyrig
                                                
rds for freedom of the speech and of the press by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”265  Government regulations of a medium for the 
communication of ideas require First Amendment scrutiny, as much as 
required for government regulations of communication itself.      
 
Against this First Amendment jurisprudence, it would be extremely 
difficult to explain how copyright law could regulate speech-facilitating 
technologies without any First Amendment concern whatsoever.  Not even 
broadcasting gets a First Amendment free pass.  Although copyright law 
typically avoids First Amendment scrutiny, as I have explained above, it 
does so only because the Court has found sufficient First Amendment 
safeguards built in copyright law.  By protecting the development of speech-
facilitating te
o
co ht law.  The only reason copyright law’s regulation of speech-
facilitating technologies can avoid First Amendment scrutiny is the 
accommodation for such technologies already provided by the Sony 
doctrine.      
 
 
261  Id. at 559. 
262  See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 657; Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, 
Inc. v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162 (2002) (recognizing “the historical importance of door-to-
door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas”). 
263  376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
264  Id.  Robert Post describes the scope of the First Amendment as extending not only 
to speech and any “medium” through which the speech—e.g., a projector displaying a 
movie—occurs, but also to the entire social interaction itself.  Robert Post, Encryption 
Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 716-17 (2000).  Post 
defines “medium” as “a set of social conventions and practices shared by speakers and 
audience.”  Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1253 (1995). 
265  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.   
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 Thus, if Congress were to enact a copyright law restricting speech 
technologies outside of Sony, some First Amendment scrutiny would apply. 
It seems doubtful that a prohibition on the production or sale of a speech-
facilitating technology that has a substantial noninfringing use could 
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “[a] 
complete ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within the 
proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil.”
 
argeted evil—
opyright law has no claim to stopping such a legitimate use of a 
y outside of Sony would violate the First Amendment.  
stead, it is to show that, at the very least, First Amendment scrutiny would 
be required.268 
enactment must  the Free Press Clause as a 
mit on the Copyright Clause.  While Congress can choose to “unwind” 
Sony,269
ing speech-
facilitating technologies when applying the doctrine.  As the Eldred Court 
recogni
t concerns.”   
                                                
266  A technology with 
a substantial noninfringing use is not an appropriately t
c
technology. For the same reason, under intermediate scrutiny, the 
prohibition would fail the narrow tailoring prong.  As the Court in Sony 
recognized, banning such a legitimate technology would “enlarge the scope 
of ... statutory monopolies to encompass control over an article of 
commerce that is not the subject of copyright protection.”267 
 
 My point, however, is not to prove that such a copyright regulation 
of speech technolog
In
 And any court considering the constitutionality of such an 
 consider the Framers’ view of
li
 or operate outside of its protections, the First Amendment always 
remains in play.     
 
B. Courts Should Apply the Sony Safe Harbor Broadly as a 
First Amendment Safeguard 
 
If we understand the Sony doctrine as a First Amendment safeguard, 
we must keep in mind its First Amendment aims in protect
zed (referring to the canon of construction to avoid constitutional 
doubt), “it is appropriate to construe copyright’s internal safeguards to 
accommodate First Amendment concerns.”270  Once Sony is recognized as 
one such internal safeguard, courts must construe it, as the Supreme Court 
has instructed, “to accommodate First Amendmen
 
 
266  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (emphasis added). 
267  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984). 
268  Even if a court had found secondary liability against Sony and ordered the payment 
of damages, First Amendment scrutiny would still be required.  Cf. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256 
(First Amendment standards of liability for award of damages in libel action).  For further 
discussion, see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
269  Cf. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony (2006) (manuscript). 
270  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 n.24 (2003) (citing United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994)). 
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I do not have the space to examine fully all of the contours of the 
Sony safe harbor as a First Amendment safeguard.  Let me suggest, 
however, four principles that courts should recognize in applying the Sony 
safe harbor’s overriding First Amendment concern of accommodating the 
development of speech-facilitating technologies. 
 
First, in determining what is a “substantial” noninfringing use, 
courts must consider the qualitative significance of a particular use, not just 
the quantitative aspect.  From the First Amendment perspective, the 
qualitative weight of speech may be more important than the quantitative.271  
After a
 new technologies.    
As Congress recognized in codifying a flexible standard of fair use in the 
1976 A
                                                
ll, the value of speech is much more than just a number or head 
count.272  The speech of one individual can be just as substantial as the 
speech of an entire nation.273  In other contexts, such as fair use and 
infringement, “substantiality” is determined in both a qualitative and 
quantitative sense.274   
 
Second, flexibility in applying the Sony safe harbor is necessary 
because the test must accommodate many different kinds of technology over 
time.  A hard-and-fast rule or strict test of proportionality is unlikely to be 
able to deal adequately with all the nuances posed by 275
ct, fair use is “especially important ‘during a period of rapid 
technological change,’ and ‘the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to 
particular situations on a case-by-case basis.’”276  The fair use doctrine is 
applied on a case-by-case basis to “afford[] considerable ‘latitude for 
scholarship and comment,’ and even for parody.”277   
 
271  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 189, 198 (1983). 
272  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779, 831-32 (1994).   
273  Just think of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, or Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech. 
274  For fair use, see 17 U.S.C.  § 107; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).  For infringement, see Ringgold v. Black Entmn’t 
Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997).  In patent law, under the staple article of 
commerce doctrine, the Federal Circuit has not taken a strict quantitative or proportionality 
approach.  See, e.g., Alloc Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(making no determination of proportion of uses); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular 
Sys., 911 F.2d 670, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (evidence of 40 to 60 percent noninfringing use 
would allow a reasonable jury to find a substantial noninfringing use).  Courts analyzing of 
substantiality of noninfringing use of an invention under patent law have analyzed both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence of substantiality.  See, e.g., Pickholtz v. Rainbow 
Technologies, 260 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2003).    
275  Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 
1307-08 (2002). 
276  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 456 
(C.D. Cal. 1979) (quoting H. Rep. No. 1476, at 5679). 
277  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003). 
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Third, courts should be wary of imposing what amounts to the death 
penalty on a new technology before it has had a chance to develop.  In 
applying the Sony doctrine, a court should consider whether the technology 
in question is new or developing.  In such case, greater leeway should be 
llowed for the new technology’s development and much less weight should 
be give
mendment challenge.  Neither 
pe of analysis is adequate, or even appropriate, to protect free press and 
speech interests—indeed, tort and economic analyses are inherently 
eficient to handle First Amendment concerns.279  Under the Court’s 
                                                
a
n to the actual uses of the technology. Because the Sony safe harbor 
attempts to provide breathing room for the development of technologies that 
have “a lawful promise,” courts must avoid rushing to judgment by 
predicating liability on a brief shapshot of a new technology’s uses in the 
market. 
 
Fourth, cost-benefit and products liability analyses cannot replace 
the Sony safe harbor, as some scholars propose,278 without rendering 
copyright law extremely vulnerable to First A
ty
d
precedents, speech is valued as an end in itself, 280  and society must bear the 
costs of protecting speech. 281  In the end, economic efficiency is not the 
measuring stick of the First Amendment.282    
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the near future, both Congress and the courts will be increasingly 
forced to consider attempts by copyright holders to regulate and even to 
prohibit speech-facilitating technologies.  For that reason, it is imperative to 
understand (i) how the Sony safe harbor functions as a First Amendment 
safeguard in copyright law, consistent with (ii) the tradition of copyright in 
 
278  See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright 
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003); Randal C. 
Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and Duty of Ongoing Design, 
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (2005); Brief of Professors Peter S. Menell, David Nimmer, 
Robert P. Merges, and Justin Hughes, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, MGM Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd., reprinted in 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 511 (2005). 
279  See Sunstein, supra note 272, at 829-31; see also MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. 
POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006). 
280  Kathleen Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963 
(1995) (“Whether the exchange of ideas is valued for its connection to truth, self-
government, or individual autonomy, the point in each setting is that speech is valuable 
independent of people’s willingness to pay for it.”). 
281  See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (“Any burden imposed upon the 
city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such 
distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press.”). 
282  Id. at 164 (“If it is said that these means are less efficient  … , the answer is that 
considerations of this sort do not empower a municipality to abridge freedom of speech and 
press.”). 
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lation of or interference with technologies that 
facilitate the dissemination of speech.  Although Congress or the courts may 
decide to depart from that tradition, any such departures must be subject to 
the same First Amendment scrutiny that applies to every other type of law 
that regulates speech technologies outside of copyright law.  When it comes 
to restricting speech technologies, not even copyright law gets a First 
Amendment free pass. 
respecting a freedom of the press—a general antipathy to allowing the 
government to control or limit the printing press or other technologies of 
speech.  For over two hundred years since the origin of copyright in the First 
Copyright Act of 1790, the tradition of our copyright system has been to 
avoid any direct regu

